Lessons from appeals of nonappealable 'judgments'

What's in a name? When it comes to determining whether a trial court ruling titled "judgment" is appealable, not much.

It is a basic tenet of appellate law that an appeal can only be taken from a final judgment or from an order specified in Code of Civil Procedure Section 904.1(a). That raises the question of what constitutes an appealable "judgment." The answer does not depend on what title the trial court or the parties give to a ruling - labeling something a judgment does not make it appealable. Appellate courts examine the nature of appealed rulings carefully. And if a purported "final judgment" does not meet the criteria for a final judgment, the appellate court will dismiss the appeal.

A recent decision by the 5th District Court of Appeal drives the point home. Baker v. Castaldi, 2015 DJDAR 3087 (filed Feb. 18, 2015; ordered partially published Mar. 16, 2015) involved a dispute over allegedly stolen antiques. The claim was adjudicated in a two-phase bench trial. The first phase addressed liability, compensatory damages, and whether there was a basis for punitive damages, and the second addressed the amount of punitive damages.

After the first phase, on May 20, 2013, the trial court filed a document titled "judgment" that awarded the plaintiff $610,500 in compensatory damages and found that the defendants had acted with malice and oppression, warranting punitive damages. The May 2013 judgment indicated that the punitive damages would "be assessed at a separate trial and set forth in an Amended Judgment."

One of the defendants appealed from the May 2013 judgment. After the trial court retroactively added two entities to the May 2013 judgment as judgment debtors, those entities likewise appealed from the May 2013 judgment. Although the trial court had decided the punitive damages issue and entered an "Amended Judgment" by the time the added debtors filed their notice of appeal, their notice did not mention the Amended Judgment or purport to appeal from it.

The parties briefed the merits of the appeals from the May 2013 judgment, and the case was set for oral argument. Three weeks before the argument, the Court of Appeal sent out a letter asking the parties to brief the issue of appealability, including whether the May 2013 judgment - the only ruling identified in the notices of appeal - was final and appealable. After considering the supplemental briefs and oral argument, the Baker Court of Appeal concluded that the May 2013 judgment was not final and dismissed the appeal.

Baker explained that appealability is jurisdictional, and that courts have a duty to consider it even if none of the parties raise the issue. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 904.1, final judgments are appealable. Most interlocutory judgments, however, are not - Section 904.1 authorizes an appeal of only three types of interlocutory judgments: a judgment determining the right to redeem property from a mortgage or lien and directing an accounting; a judgment directing a partition; and a judgment directing a party or attorney to pay sanctions of more than $5,000.

The state Supreme Court has defined a final judgment as one that resolves all of the issues between the parties, "except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with" its terms. Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., 25 Cal. 4th 688, 698 (2001). Griset held that, "where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory." The May 2013 "judgment" left the amount of punitive damages to be determined in a future trial. Under the Griset test, Baker concluded, the May 2013 judgment therefore was not final.

The Baker appellants argued that their appeal should be heard because the May 2013 order was titled "judgment," or because the respondent waived any objection to appealability by not raising the issue on its own. The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It emphasized that "[a] paper filed in an action does not become a judgment merely because it is so entitled; it is a judgment only if it satisfies the criteria of a judgment." And because appealability is jurisdictional, there is no equitable exception to its requirements, nor can jurisdiction be conferred by waiver.

As an alternative, the appellants argued that the court should construe the notices of appeal to encompass the trial court's post-May 2013 rulings. Baker rejected that argument as well, reasoning that the May 2013 "judgment" was the only order identified in the notices and that under existing precedent, "it is well 'beyond liberal construction' to view an appeal from one order as an appeal from a 'further and different order.'"

Baker acknowledged that its result "may seem harsh." It did not, however, leave the appellants completely without recourse. In an unpublished footnote, the court noted that it was "troubled by" two of the trial court's post-May 2013 orders and explained the flaws in the orders. And in a published footnote, the court added that if the orders were void on their face, the appellants could move in the trial court to set them aside, and that a trial court order denying such a motion might be appealable.

Baker illustrates that it is critical for a losing party to identify when the court has entered a truly final judgment, and to file a timely notice of appeal from it. When in doubt as to whether a judgment is final, there is no harm in filing a cautionary notice of appeal. But stay alert: If the court subsequently resolves additional issues and enters a new judgment disposing of the entire case, file a new notice of appeal from that judgment as well. It will probably be the one that counts.