Civil Rights
May 28, 2004
In 'Lane,' Court Finally Sees Disabilities Act as Civil Rights Tool
Forum Column - By Michael Waterstone - Last week, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Lane as lawyers interested in both civil rights and federalism watched closely.
Michael Waterstone
Fritz B. Burns Dean, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
Email: michael.waterstone@lls.edu
By Michael Waterstone
Last week, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Lane as lawyers interested in both civil rights and federalism watched closely.
The facts in this case are relatively straightforward and very sympathetic to the plaintiff. George Lane, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility, was ordered to appear on the second floor of a courthouse with no elevator. He crawled up once, then after the court closed for lunch and reopened, he declined to be carried up the stairs for afternoon court and was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. The Supreme Court upheld the part of the Americans with Disabilities Act that allows Lane to sue the state of Tennessee for damages.
The Supreme Court's decision can be understood at two levels. It is the second, more subtle meaning that probably will prove more significant.
The first meaning of Tennessee v. Lane - the "federal courts" meaning - is more about federalism than civil rights or disability law. The primary question in this case is not whether Tennessee discriminated against Lane on the basis of his disability or whether being carried up a flight of stairs in a wheelchair is offensive to a litigant's dignity. Rather, the constitutional question is when Congress may write a statute allowing litigants to sue states for damages.
One of the only times Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity is to enforce Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, which contains the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. In this case, Tennessee argued that the disabilities act exceeded Congress' 14th Amendment powers.
This argument worked before. In University of Alabama v. Garrett, a case involving state employment, the court held that, to abrogate states' sovereign immunity using the 14th Amendment, Congress must find a sufficient pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against people with disabilities in the specific area of state employment.
Earlier Supreme Court case law held that people with disabilities are not a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore laws that draw lines on the basis of disability are evaluated under a rational-basis standard. Because the court found that Congress did not find a sufficient pattern of irrational discrimination against people with disabilities in state employment, Congress had exceeded its 14th Amendment powers by providing for damages against state employers.
This time, however, the court rejected this argument. Unlike employment, access to courts, which is the activity at issue in Tennessee v. Lane, is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, meaning that laws that impair its exercise are subject to heightened scrutiny. The court therefore gave Congress more latitude in enacting laws protecting the right to access courts.
So under this analysis, the key factor in the decision is the fundamental right of all citizens of access to courts, not the civil rights of people with disabilities to equal treatment. At this first level of analysis, the predictable legacy of Tennessee v. Lane will involve challenges to discrimination affecting other fundamental rights, foremost among them voting, which is discussed at length in the opinion.
The second meaning of Tennessee v. Lane ultimately may prove more powerful. This can be termed the "civil rights" meaning. More so than in any other case, the Supreme Court in Lane indicates that it is starting to understand disability discrimination. Congress clearly did when it passed the disabilities act, stating that people with disabilities "have been ... subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment ... resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society."
But too often, the court's decisions have begrudgingly treated the disabilities act as a glorified benefits statute, and it has spent its energy on the squabble of who is entitled to its protection.
In contrast, for the first time, this case harmonizes the views of the majority of the court on disability discrimination with the stated intention of Congress. The majority opinion pays careful attention to the documented unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs for people with disabilities. Justice David Souter's concurrence notes that, in upholding the disabilities act's damages provisions, the court takes a step away from a tradition of laws that "classified people without regard to individual capacities, and by that lack of regard did great harm."
Under this view of the case, the court values the civil rights of people with disabilities - that is, George Lane's dignity in not having to be carried up a flight of stairs to get to his court appearance - over the dignity of the state of Tennessee in not being sued for damages against its will.
The court recognized that people with disabilities are a group deserving of federal civil rights laws, which are necessary to fight the evils of state-sanctioned second-class citizenship. In so doing, this is the first case that focuses on the disabilities act's power and breadth as intended by Congress.
But at this second level of meaning, the court is most clearly and deeply split. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg indicates an understanding and agreement of the act's mission in her statement that "[i]ncluding individuals with disabilities among people who count in composing 'We the People,' Congress understood [that] in shaping the ADA, [this] would sometimes require not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but accommodation."
But Justice Antonin Scalia dismisses the act as fundamentally different from true civil rights statutes and characterizes it as belonging in the "field of social policy."
Along this fault line, the real battles of disability discrimination and civil rights law will be fought. Disability rights advocates will rely on this second meaning when they attempt to expand Lane's holding to other areas that are not as "fundamental" under the Due Process Clause: access to public parks, stadiums, and even sidewalks. Time will tell how much Tennessee v. Lane will help in that quest.
Michael Waterstone is an assistant professor of law at the University of Mississippi Law School. He is co-author of "Disability Civil Rights Law & Policy."
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