Justices clarify California misdemeanor ‘hot pursuit’ law

The U.S. Supreme Court sided with a California motorist on Wednesday, ruling that under the Fourth Amendment pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home.

The court vacated a California 1st District Court of Appeal decision and remanded the case.

Justice Elena Kagan's opinion, though unanimous, was accompanied by several limited concurrences grouping different justices on different points, and two specifically disagreeing with part of her ruling.

"The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that police officers get a warrant before entering a home without permission," Kagan wrote. "A great many misdemeanor pursuits involve exigencies allowing warrantless entry. But whether a given one does so turns on the particular facts of the case."

Officers have good reason to enter a property in situations like preventing violence, destruction of evidence or escape, the court found.

"But when the officer has time to get a warrant, he must do so -- even though the misdemeanant fled," the opinion stated.

The case stems from Arthur G. Lange's arrest in Sonoma in 2016 after a California Highway Patrol officer noticed he was playing his music loudly and honking his horn unnecessarily.

According to court records, the officer believed Lange's behavior violated the Vehicle Code, a misdemeanor. When the officer indicated Lange should pull over, Lange drove a short distance and entered his garage. The officer followed Lange into the garage and observed signs of intoxication, which was later confirmed by a blood test.

Jeffrey Fisher, co-director of the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic at Stanford Law School, argued the matter before the Supreme Court. He said he was gratified the court restricted the authority of police officers to enter people's homes.

"For hundreds of years, the warrant requirement has protected personal privacy and provided a means of assuring individuals that officers are acting lawfully. Warrants thereby honor the rule of law and help to avoid tragic outcomes," he said in an email.

Amanda K. Rice, a Jones Day attorney in Detroit, argued against Fisher, after the California attorney general, who had defended Lange's conviction before the Court of Appeal told the court that the 'hot pursuit' exception did not apply to fleeing misdemeanor suspects. The Supreme Court appointed Rice, who previously clerked for Kagan, to argue the state's case. She did not respond to requests for comment.

This case-by-case rule articulated by the court leaves the first interpretation of the law up to the law enforcement officer to make an immediate decision, said Myron Moskovitz of Moskovitz Appellate Team in Piedmont, who was not involved in the case.

"I think it's a very reasonable opinion," but it is easier on police, and everyone, to have a categorical rule, Moskovitz said. "When you get into these case by case things, it's very hard on them. If it's hard for a Supreme Court judge to decide whether this particular entry was justified based on all the circumstances. How can a local cop? And he's got one minute to make the decision. That's the tension that's going on here."

"The problem with a categorical rule is there are going to be situations where the particular facts don't fit well into the rule so, there may be some unfairness. So to me, that's the real issue in this case," Moskovitz added.

Some of the justices wrote concurring statements highlighting situations they said create exigent circumstances for warrantless entry. One of three concurring statements was by Justice Clarence Thomas, who said some historical categorical exceptions exist, including when a person is arrested and escapes and when law enforcement is in hot pursuit of a person who has breached the peace.

Thomas also focused on the exclusionary aspect of the case in his statement. "I also write to point out that even if the state courts on remand conclude that the officer's entry here was unlawful, the federal exclusionary rule does not require suppressing any evidence."

Lange's original defense attorney, Peter Goodman of San Francisco, plans to argue the entry was illegal and evidence from the entry should be suppressed.

"Our position is that the suppression of the evidence is required, because there was illegal entry and all of the evidence against Mr. Lange on the charge of driving under the influence was obtained after the police officer entered the garage," he said.

Deputy District Attorney Robert A. Maddock, who represented Sonoma County in Lange's appeal, said, "While we are somewhat disappointed in the Supreme Court's ruling, we respect the court's decision and appreciate the clarification of the law for guidance in the future. The rule in California applied the 'hot pursuit' exception to the warrant requirement in misdemeanor cases in California for more than three decades. Many other state and federal jurisdictions did so as well."

He said, "We believe the record still supports application of the warrant exception in this case based on the totality of the circumstances, and that ultimately our trial court should still be affirmed. The defendant is a multiple DUI offender who was on DUI probation at the time of the offense. Based on the extreme danger to public safety of his continuing conduct of driving while intoxicated, we would not dismiss the case unless the Court of Appeal rules to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress."

Gregory S. McNeal, a professor of law at Pepperdine's Caruso School of Law, called Wednesday's ruling appropriate, adding not all flight should be considered "hot pursuit." "For cases where it's clear that the officer is not justified in entering a home, they will pause and get a warrant and on the close call cases, it's going to be a little bit more difficult for the officers," he said. "But in those cases, we traditionally see the court side with the police because they defer to the judgment of officers in the field. So it's not going to materially impact the police. But in these types of cases, it's going to materially benefit people's individual liberties."