Supplemental jurisdiction in ADA cases: A question of timing

Argued and submitted on July 8, 2020, and only now published, Arroyo v. Rosas, 2021 DJDAR 12573 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2021), provides answers to questions that have bedeviled district courts and practitioners in Americans with Disability Act cases. Those questions are: (1) Is it an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that, based on reasons of comity, "exceptional circumstances" permit it to dismiss supplemental state Unruh Act claims from a federal ADA lawsuit; and (2) if "exceptional circumstances" do exist for dismissing the Unruh Act claims, what guidance is there for making a case-specific judgment that there are "compelling reasons" for declining supplemental jurisdiction in the specific case. The answer to the first question is "no," it is not an abuse of discretion to conclude exceptional circumstances exist. The answer to the second question, whether there are compelling reasons to dismiss the state claims, turns on the timing of the dismissal.

Arroyo is of significant practical importance, because it will impact decisions made by ADA plaintiffs, defendants and judges.

While the ADA provides for injunctive relief, but not monetary damages, the Unruh Act provides for injunctive relief and damages. Therefore, the Unruh Act balances the added benefit to plaintiffs of including a damages remedy with an expense and burdens not found in the ADA: In construction-related disability access cases, high-frequency litigants must pay a $1,000 filing fee; pleadings must be verified; and a proper pleading has specificity requirements. A prevailing plaintiff can recover attorney fees under either act. And every violation of the ADA is a violation of the Unruh Act. It follows that ADA plaintiffs filing in federal court want to include supplemental state claims in order to have the benefit of recovering damages under the Unruh Act, without the expense and burdens imposed on filing Unruh Act disability access claims in state court. In contrast, defendants have generally preferred to defend against the injunctive relief claim in federal court by mooting the available remedy of injunctive relief with timely remediation, when possible, before going to trial on the merits. This defense tactic, when successful, will force ADA plaintiffs to refile Unruh Act claims in state court if those claims are to be preserved.

The courts have their own administrative interest in disposing of ADA cases. The Central District of California has seen a steep increase in ADA claims: 419 ADA cases filed in 2013 (3% of civil filings), 928 in 2014 (7 %), 1,386 in 2016 (10%), 1,670 in 2017 (12%), 2,720 in 2018 (18%), and 1,868 in the first six months of 2019 (24%). The Central District has dealt with the volume of ADA cases by developing an extensive mediation program that engages many court-appointed mediators. Also, many district court judges have been routinely dismissing the supplemental Unruh Act claims in the ADA cases.

A year after filing his complaint, the ADA plaintiff, Arroyo, moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion after Rosas, who was proceeding in pro se, failed to respond. However, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over Arroyo's Unruh Act claim, finding "exceptional circumstances" for declining jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(4). The district court noted that California had special pleading and filing requirements for Unruh Act claims that could be evaded by a federal filing, and concluded that since California adopted the restrictions, cases filed in the Central District had "skyrocketed both numerically and as a percentage of total civil filings."

Because the law is clear that congested dockets are not a solely sufficient reason for federal courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction of state claims, the Court of Appeals framed the argument for declining jurisdiction as one based on "comity" rather than on congested dockets: "[T]he procedural strictures that California put in place have been rendered largely toothless, because they can now be readily evaded. ... [R]etention of supplemental jurisdiction over ADA-based Unruh Act claims threatens to substantially thwart California's carefully crafted reforms in this area and to deprive the state courts of their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms ... [T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the situation presented here involves 'exceptional circumstances' within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4)."

But the analysis did not stop here, because finding "compelling reasons" for declining supplemental jurisdiction also requires a case-specific analysis of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, and comity, the so-called "Gibbs values," after United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Those factors weighed in favor of retaining supplemental jurisdiction. Why? The district court had decided the ADA case before dismissing the supplemental claims, and the supplemental Unruh Act claims mirrored the ADA claims. It made no sense from the perspective of judicial economy to go back to state court once the federal claims had been decided by the court's ruling on the summary judgment motion. Under the Unruh Act, this ineluctably resulted in a successful claim for monetary damages in the statutory amount of $4,000 in favor of Arroyo. Though Arroyo provided enough evidence to warrant prospective injunctive relief, he apparently did not provide enough to show he was actually deterred on a "particular" occasion. So under the Unruh Act, he was not entitled to a further award of damages. The Court of Appeals saw no benefit in sending Arroyo to state court, after the case had been resolved, in order to "dun" him for $1,000.

The scorecard is somewhat mixed. Defendant won her argument that "exceptional circumstances" existed. But plaintiff won his case-specific argument that supplemental jurisdiction should be retained in his specific case, because defendant waited too long to dismiss.

Though the district court abused its discretion in this particular case by declining supplemental jurisdiction, the important point for the administration of justice is that the Court of Appeals has provided a guidepost for declining supplemental jurisdiction. Parties and courts wishing to avoid supplemental jurisdiction must act promptly, or else issues of judicial economy and fairness to the litigants can end up outweighing the argument that comity requires the court to decline jurisdiction.

Arroyo will impact the decision of ADA plaintiffs to file their Unruh Act claims in federal court. If the Unruh Act claims are dismissed early, jurisdiction in federal court will rest on the availability of injunctive relief, the remedy provided by the ADA. And if the defendant is able to quickly remediate, the case will be mooted, leaving the plaintiff with the decision of whether to file Unruh Act claims in state court.

The availability of attorney fees provides ADA plaintiffs and their attorneys a motivation to choose the better forum from the outset. A plaintiff who has a good Unruh Act claim for damages, but a weak claim for injunctive relief, and who chooses the federal forum for filing a complaint, risks losing attorney fees whenever the access problem is remediated, mooting the federal case, and supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claims is declined. Under those circumstances, while there may be a creative or exotic theory for recovery of attorney fees incurred in the federal action, it is likely to be a stretch.

Arroyo will impact the decision of district court judges who would like to simplify their ADA cases. They can dismiss the supplemental Unruh Act claims early on, with a citation to Arroyo v. Rosas, the Gibbs values, and exceptional circumstances.

Arroyo will impact the flow of ADA filings in the Central District and other districts. Where there has been an increase in federal ADA filings, one can expect that the filing of disability access cases will begin to flow back into our state courts. Perhaps this will not be a shock to the federal or the state system, because during the years that the Arroyo case has sat in the Court of Appeals, many district court judges have been routinely declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Arroyo leaves some open questions. First, while it is clear that after a ruling for the plaintiff on a motion for summary judgment it is too late to dismiss the Unruh Act disability claims, is there some point before the definitive ruling by which the parties have invested so much time, money, and effort in the case that the Gibbs values would weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction? Is there a bright line, or will this be decided on a case-specific basis? Second, given the Gibbs values and the finding of exceptional circumstances on the one hand, and the discretionary standard that applies to the retention of supplemental jurisdiction on the other hand, can it ever be an abuse of discretion for the district judge to choose to retain supplemental jurisdiction? Questions for another day. 