Top 2024 Trust & Estate Appellate Decisions

California probate, trust, estate, and conservatorship law is constantly evolving. These recent appellate decisions have implications for estate litigators, estate planners, estate administrators, conservators, and their families and provide critical guidance on the interpretation and application of laws governing these matters.

Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729

Haggerty v. Thornton settles California law on the requirements for amending a trust, specifically clarifying how a trust may be amended when multiple methods are available.

In Haggerty, the decedent, Jeane M. Bertsch, executed a trust, which was amended in 2016 in favor of the appellant, Brianna McKee Haggerty, her niece. Subsequently, the decedent executed two additional documents disinheriting the appellant. Neither of these documents complied with the specific provisions for amending set forth in the trust, although each complied with probate code requirements for amending.

After Bertsch's death, her niece filed a petition to determine the validity of the amendments. The probate court held that the amendments were valid, holding that because compliance with the trust's stated method for amending the trust was not exclusive, compliance with probate code amendment requirements was sufficient.

Haggerty appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Bertsch's amendments were valid under the probate code.

Haggerty sought review, and the Supreme Court affirmed, overruling previous cases (Balistreri v. Balistreri (2022) 75 Cal. App. 5th 511, review granted, May 11, 2022, S273909) and (King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal. App. 4th 1186, 1192, 1193, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 553). The court clarified that under Probate Code Section 15401(a), a trust can be amended by any method provided in the trust instrument or by a signed writing delivered to the trustee during the settlor's lifetime, unless the trust explicitly states that its specified method is exclusive. In this case, because the trust did not specify that its amendment method was exclusive, the amendments were valid because they complied with probate code requirements.

Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939

Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC examines the scope of authority granted to a healthcare agent under an advanced healthcare directive, specifically whether this authority includes the power to enter into arbitration agreements.

Charles Logan named his nephew, Mark Harrod, as his health care agent using a form specifically citing California's Health Care Decisions Law (Prob. Code § 4600 et seq.). The form gave Harrod the power to make various healthcare decisions.

Utilizing that form, Harrod admitted Logan to the skilled nursing facility at Country Oaks Care Center. Harrod signed two agreements. The first was an admission agreement that authorized Logan's care at the facility and specified services, payment, and facility rules. The second was an optional arbitration agreement.

Taking issue with Logan's care, Harrod filed a lawsuit for elder abuse and breaches of care standards. Country Oaks sought to compel arbitration based on the agreement Harrod signed. The Court denied the motion because the authority granted to Harrod only gave him the ability to make health care decisions. It did not authorize him to enter into an arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision.

The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the power to make "health care decisions" does not include the authority to enter into arbitration agreements. The court emphasized that healthcare decisions are limited to consent for medical care, selection of physicians and facilities, and the release of medical information. They do not include the ability to enter into dispute resolution agreements.

Newman v. Casey (2024) 99 Cal. App. 5th 359

Newman v. Casey addresses the scope, purpose, and limitations of Elder Abuse Restraining Orders (EAROs) under California law.

Gracia Bovis applied for an elder abuse restraining order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03, alleging her daughter, Marina Casey, tricked Bovis into signing a deed that gave Casey ownership of her house. At the hearing granting the elder abuse restraining order, the court also issued an order finding the deed void ab initio. Casey appealed both the restraining order and the finding that the deed was void.

The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the probate court's decision to grant the elder abuse restraining order, finding that the EARO was justified under Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.03. However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that the deed was void ab initio because, based on legislative history, EAROs are to prevent future abuse, not remedy past abuse. Therefore, any action to declare the deed void must be pursued through separate civil litigation, not by an EARO.

Conservatorship of the Person of T.B (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1361

The case of Conservatorship of T.B. addresses the procedural requirements for Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) conservatorships and the potential implications of delays in trial proceedings.

The Public Guardian for Contra Costa filed an LPS Conservatorship for an individual diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and methamphetamine use disorder who had been homeless for over a decade. Despite a statutory requirement to commence trial within ten days of a demand for trial, several continuances were granted due to the court's calendar. The proposed conservatee filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings due to these delays. The trial court denied the motion, the conservatorship was established, and the conservatee appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. It determined that while "mandatory" statutory requirements are obligatory, procedural requirements are "directory." The court concluded that the ten days were intended to be directory, not mandatory.

Therefore, while the trial failed to comply with the ten-day requirement, the language allowing dismissal on these grounds was discretionary, not mandatory. Additionally, since the proposed conservatee's attorney did not raise the issue until after multiple continuances and the delay did not adversely affect the defense, there was no due process violation.