I.F., a Minor

Summary

On Nov. 3, 2014, juvenile ward, I.F., petitioned to seal his records pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 781. On Dec. 3, the court found that he successfully completed probation and terminated, inter alia, its jurisdiction, wardship, and his delinquency and probation violation petitions. On Jan. 1, 2015, Section 786 became effective, requiring the automatic sealing of juvenile records upon satisfactory completion of probation for any offense not listed in Section 707(b). It was undisputed that I.F.’s offenses did not fall under that list. By April, I.F. faced serious charges, wherein the prosecution sought disclosure of I.F.’s juvenile records for impeachment purposes. Ultimately, the court denied I.F.’s petition to seal under Section 781, finding that he failed to meet the statutory requirement of attaining rehabilitation. Thereafter, the court granted the prosecution’s disclosure petition. On appeal, I.F. contended that Section 786 applies to his pending petition.

“[T]he newly added section 786 is clearly not punitive … while the juvenile court was granted a degree of discretion under former section 781 … the legislature, by enacting section 786, effectively made the decision to seal … an administrative decision … we conclude the application of section 786 must be deemed prospective rather than retroactive.”

- Justice Jenkins

Reversed and remanded. It is well-established that statutes operate prospectively absent a clear indication of voter or Legislature’s contrary intent. In Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s LLC, our state’s highest court recognized that, “viewed functionally, a statute that establishes rules for the conduct of pending litigation without changing the legal consequences of past conduct ‘“‘is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its enactment.’”’” Rather, the effect of such statutes is actually prospective because they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future. Section 786 was one such statute because it eliminated the former statute’s “satisfactory rehabilitation” requirement and mandated automatic sealing where the juvenile successfully completes probation on non-Section 707(b) offenses—which I.F. undisputedly met here. Overall, this court concluded that the juvenile court erroneously denied I.F.’s petition to seal.
Opinion by Justice Jenkins.

— Karen Natividad