Modification: Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility District

JAYNIE CAMPANA et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

EAST BAY MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

No. A163054

(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG20050136)

California Court of Appeal

First Appellate District

Division Four

Filed June 15, 2023

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING; NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 23, 2023, be modified as follows:

1. On page 4, change the first word in the third paragraph from "Plaintiff's" to "Plaintiffs'."

2. On page 11, change the first word in footnote 8 from "Although" to "While" and add a comma after the word "ordinances" so that the footnote reads:

While the distinction is immaterial for our purposes, plaintiffs refer to tiered-rate structures adopted in "ordinances," although the rate structures they challenge were enacted in resolutions.

3. On page 16, after the paragraph ending with "adopting the taxes. (Ibid.)" add the following paragraph, including footnote 10, which will require renumbering the subsequent footnote:

Plaintiffs' reliance on Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744 and Schmidt v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 23 for the general proposition that filing a timely claim under the Government Claims Act "extends the time for filing suit even when another statute of limitations has lapsed" is misplaced. Both cases merely hold that the Government Claims Act extends the limitations period otherwise provided for in Code of Civil Procedure section 340. (Gatto, supra, at pp. 755, 765; Schmidt, supra, at p. 30.) The decisions are consistent with Code of Civil Procedure sections 313, which provides that the "general procedure for presentation of claims as prerequisite to commencement of actions for money or damages against government entities is prescribed by the [Government Claims Act]" and 342, which provides that "[a]n action against a public entity upon a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with [the Government Claims Act] must be commenced within the time provided in Section 945.6 of the Government Code."¹⁰ Code of Civil Procedure section 312 provides, however, that this framework set forth in title 2 of part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the foregoing provisions, does not apply when another statute provides otherwise: "Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 312, italics added.) That is because the general statutes of limitations provisions in title 2 must be read in conjunction with section 312. (People v. Overstock.com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1075-1076.) As Public Utilities Code section 14402, which applies "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," prescribes a different limitations period, the provisions of title 2 that would otherwise give way to section 14402's specific limitations period.

¹⁰ Government Code section 945.6, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part "any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division must be commenced: [¶] (1) If written notice is given in accordance with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail.(2) If written notice is not given in accordance with Section 913, within two years from the accrual of the cause of action."

4. On page 17, the concluding paragraph is modified as follows: (a) after the clause "assuming notice was required" add the words "and timely given"; (b) on the third line of the paragraph, between the words "did not" and "extend" add the words "operate to"; and (c) delete the parenthetical "(which had already run by the time any government claim was presented)" so that the paragraph reads:

Here, assuming notice was required and timely given under the Government Claims Act, compliance with any time requirements imposed by that Act did not operate to extend the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' action seeking a refund of allegedly illegal fees. Because the gravamen of the complaint is a challenge to the tiered-rate structure adopted by EBMUD's 2017 and 2019 resolutions, the validation statute's shorter statute of limitations governs. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer.¹¹

There is no change in the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

BROWN, P. J.

Trial court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial judge: Honorable Winifred Smith

Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants: BERDING & WEIL LLP, Fredrick A. Hagen, Paul G. Kerkorian

Counsel for defendant and appellant: Derek McDonald, Felicity Grisham