Facts

The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against AMG Services Inc., SFS Inc, Red Cedar Services Inc., and MNE Services Inc., and several other defendants, in connection with the defendants' lending practices.

The FTC filed this claim in April 2012. In Dec., the court signed an order entering the parties' joint stipulation for preliminary injunction and bifurcation, which divided the litigation into a liability phase and a relief phase. In July 2013, defendants, which included AMG, SFS, Red Cedar, and MNE, as well as other defendants, including AMG Capital Management, Level 5 Motorsports, and numerous others, stipulated to settle Counts II and IV with the FTC. However, several defendants, referred to as the Muir Defendants, were left out of the settlement because the Muir Defendants' liability was largely depended upon the FTC's common enterprise theory. In January 2014, the court entered summary judgment in favor of FTC on Counts I and III against all defendants, but denied without prejudice the motion as to Counts II and IV against the Muir Defendants and the lending defendants on Count III. The court then recommended the bifurcation order be amended to permit Counts II and IV to proceed against the Muir Defendants during the second phase of the proceedings.

COMPLAINANT'S CONTENTIONS:
The FTC alleged that defendants violated portions of the FTC Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act by offering and extending "high-fee, short-term 'payday' loans and activities related with the collection of those loans.

DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS:
Defendants argued that the court, among others, erred in failing to grant summary judgment in its favor by applying an incorrect legal standard, by improperly treating fact questions as questions of law, and by violating the summary judgment standard in resolving disputes of material fact in the FTC's favor.

Result

The court rejected defendants' contentions. As a result, it adopted the court's prior findings, granting the FTC's motion for summary judgment on Count I and III, and denying it without prejudice as to Counts II and IV. It also ordered to amend the bifurcation order to allow Counts II and IV to proceed against the Muir Defendants during Phase II of the litigation.