Facts

On May 10, 2017, Fresno Police Department officers were returning to Fresno from an unrelated call nearby. While the officers were driving near Palm Avenue and Santa Fe, they saw a man walking in and out of the street, waving his arms, and yelling. Upon contact with the man, the officers suspected he was under the influence of a controlled substance and confirmed he was on AB 109 probation.

Officers initially sat the man on the curb. One of the officers called for EMS Code 2, followed by a second call to EMS a short time later, requesting Code 3, or an emergency response. The man suddenly sprang up from a seated position and appeared that he might run back into the roadway. Officers and an assisting sheriff's deputy told the man to sit back down. The man did not comply and was then taken to the ground. The man was initially on his back but turned onto his stomach during the struggle. The officers used control holds in an effort to keep the man still and prevent him from injuring himself while they waited for EMS to arrive. The man continued to yell, scream, and resist officers--at one point scraping his head onto the concrete. A RIPP restraint was briefly applied to the man's ankles, but it was ineffective as he continued to kick at the officers. Throughout the interaction, multiple officers and deputies asked the man if he could breathe, and he confirmed that he could.

After responding to the wrong location, EMS finally arrived approximately fourteen minutes after the first call was placed. Upon arrival, a paramedic ordered the placement of a backboard on top of the man's back while he was still in a prone position. After the backboard was placed on the man, the paramedic ordered one of the officers to sit on top of the backboard. The officer, who had been trained to defer to on-scene medical personnel with regard to a subject's medical care, sat on the backboard near the man's buttocks area. At some point, the man stopped vocalizing but continued moving around under the backboard. The officer immediately stood up, and the paramedic and EMT continued the restraint process. Afterward, the board was turned over, and the paramedic determined the man did not have a pulse. At that point, EMS placed the man on a gurney and loaded him into the ambulance for transport to the hospital. The man never regained consciousness and was later pronounced deceased.

Although the autopsy revealed a toxic amount of methamphetamine in the man's system, the County coroner determined the cause of death was compressive asphyxia with restraint. The defense medical experts disagreed with this determination, as the man had significant underlying cardiac disease (which was revealed in the autopsy), asthma, and was released from a hospital the day before after exhibiting hallucinations and agitated delirium symptoms from extreme drug use.

PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTIONS: Plaintiffs contended that defendants used excessive force in restraining Perez, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Since the deputies asphyxiated and killed Perez by restraining him in a prone position and sitting on his back until he died, the defendant deputies and officers used deadly force. Plaintiffs argued that excessive force was used because the crimes potentially involved were not severe or not crimes at all; Perez was not an immediate threat to defendant officers since he was handcuffed from the beginning of the encounter; although defendant deputies described Perez as combative or resistant, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant deputies were witnessing Perez's involuntary reactions to being asphyxiated; defendant deputies created a dangerous situation by positioning Perez in such a manner that he could not adequately breathe; in terms of alternative means, defendant deputies could have positioned Perez on his side or in a seated position; and defendant deputies violated their training regarding hog-tying, restraining a subject on his stomach, and restraint asphyxiation. Plaintiffs also contended that the use of a towel around Perez's face could have interfered with his breathing and that it was the equivalent of a spit mask that was used in violation of county policy. Plaintiffs asserted that qualified immunity was inappropriate because it was obviously unconstitutional for a group of officers to asphyxiate, kill and handcuff a defenseless man who told them he could not breathe; precedent established that such conduct is unconstitutional; and defendant deputies were trained in policies against the form of retraint used yet violated those policies. Plaintiffs also claimed violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs argued that the facts of this case were indicative of deliberate indifference because officers asphyxiated an unarmed and defenseless man who was already handcuffed and who posed no substantial danger to anyone; the asphyxiation did not involve a split-second judgment; and even if there was no time to deliberate, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a purpose to harm. As to qualified immunity, plaintiffs argued that for the reasons that qualified immunity was inappropriate for the Fourth Amendment claims, it was inappropriate for the Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs also asserted Monell liability claims against city and county defendants. With respect to city defendant, plaintiffs argued that while written city policies prohibit officers from engaging in the conduct that killed Perez, the defendant officers' testimony showed that they were unaware of these policies. With respect to county defendant, while county defendant has policies that prohibit deputies from engaging in the conduct that killed Perez, the defendant deputies violated those policies. Plaintiffs also alleged state law claims against all defendants for battery, negligence, and California Civil Code Section 52.1, and for violation of California Health & Safety Code Section 1799.102 against AA defendants.

DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS: In response to plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims, county defendants contended that none of their individual applications of force on Perez was excessive. Similarly, city defendants argued that city officers used reasonable amounts of force to attempt to restrain Perez because the level of force used by defendants Calvert and Martinez was low-level hands-on force. Alternatively, city defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In response to plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims, defendants argued that their conduct did not shock the conscious because there was no purpose to harm Perez; in terms of deliberate indifference, the actions of the deputies prior to the arrival of AA personnel were performed in an attempt to gain compliance from Perez and to contain his resistance. Alternatively, county deputy defendants argued that the law was not clearly established and thus, they were entitled to qualified immunity. Similarly, city defendants contended that because Perez's restraint resulted from a snap judgment about the best way to handle the escalating situation, the purpose to harm standard applied; even if the deliberate indifference standard applied, the officers' use of force was not without justification and was reasonable. Alternatively, the city officers argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. With respect to plaintiffs' assertion of Monell liability, county defendants argued that there was no Monell liability because there was no constitutional violation and because none of the Monell theories advanced by plaintiffs were viable. City defendants argued that there was no constitutional violation, plaintiffs failed to show that any city policies were deliberately indifferent or the cause of any constitutional violations, there was no evidence that city defendant disregarded a substantial risk of inadequate training, and plaintiffs failed to identify a deficiency in training. Anderson argued that he is entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claims alleged against him. AA personnel were called to render medical aid and medical transport pursuant to § 5150. No Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority has addressed liability for Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violations by a paramedic. However, cases from the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits indicate that emergency responders/paramedics like Anderson who restrain individuals while providing emergency medical aid are not subject to liability under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, because it was not clearly established that any action by Anderson was unconstitutional, qualified immunity is appropriate. Additionally, with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment interference with familial relationship claim, Anderson argued that he was not deliberately indifferent and did not act with a purpose to harm. The evidence demonstrates that his actions were undertaken for medical purposes and not for a purpose to harm or with deliberate indifference.

Result

The court granted the City of Fresno's, County of Fresno's, and American Ambulance's motions for summary judgment as to all of the federal claims and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. As to plaintiffs' first claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and third claim for substantive due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court determined the officers were entitled to qualified immunity as to these claims. As to plaintiffs' fifth claim for municipal liability against the City of Fresno, the court determined that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate deliberately indifferent training. Accordingly, the punitive damages claims against the individual officers and deputies were also dismissed.

Other Information

Plaintiffs intend to appeal the court's ruling on the federal claims.