Voter Identification Prevents Fraud

This is in regard to the Forum article ("The Real Fraud," Feb. 11, 2008) wherein the writer asserted that voters should not be required to produce identification in order to cast a ballot. I disagree.

I've been a poll worker in Orange County for several years. It has been my experience that half the voters either have identification in their hand or are reaching for their wallet or purse to get their identification as they come to the poll workers' table to check in. Most voters expect that they will be asked for identification. I do not believe that conscientious citizens will mind in the least being required to show identification before being allowed to vote.

Also, some form of identification is necessary to prevent voter fraud. If someone wishes to vote fraudulently, all they have to do is look at the "precinct street index," which is posted at the polling place, and see who has not yet voted. This index is updated hourly with the names of those who have already voted crossed off.

The fraudulent voter could simply memorize the name and address of someone who has not yet voted and then present himself or herself to a poll worker giving that name and address. He or she would then be given a ballot, or an access number to vote electronically, and could then vote. The fraud would not be discovered unless and until the real voter showed up and tried to sign in - when he or she would be told they've already voted.

If this were done after 6:30 p.m., after most who are going to vote have already voted, it is unlikely the fraud would ever be discovered. But even if the fraud is discovered, the fraudulent voter's vote is already in and cannot be recalled, rescinded or invalidated.

All it takes for a fraudulent voter - or a group of fraudulent voters - to pull this off is the ability to memorize a name and address. They could go from precinct to precinct doing this. So voter identification is necessary to prevent fraud.

Richard J. Chrystie
Attorney
Orange

William S. Lerach Is Disgraced, Not Defamed

In a Daily Journal Page 1 article ("Coughlin Stoia Diversifies, Starts Patent Litigation Group," Jan. 31, 2008) on the Coughlin Stoia firm's diversification, he described the firm's founder William S. Lerach as "defamed."

In modern usage, "defamed," as defined in Webster's, applies to one whose reputation has been harmed by libel or slander.

I suggest you might reconsider this adjective's accuracy in the face of 1) Mr. Lerach's guilty plea to a federal felony charge, 2) his State Bar classification of "not eligible to practice law" (explained on the bar's Web site as "interim suspension after conviction") and 3) his prison sentence.

As an alternative, you could explain that you intended "defamed" in its archaic sense: disgraced.

John H. Sullivan
President, Civil Justice Association of California
Sacramento

Public Defenders Are Entitled to Strike

In a Daily Journal op-ed ("Union Hijack," Jan. 29, 2008), R. Konrad Moore suggests that public defenders who choose to strike betray the constitutional rights and liberty of their clients.

Shame on Moore for thinking that public defenders owe more to society than other lawyers, public officials or average citizens. Moore seems to believe that becoming a government employee, a public defender, means that one's human and normal rights are checked at the door.

Yes, becoming a lawyer does mean that there are certain rights and responsibilities one takes on that are not required by others. However, I do not hear Moore suggesting that all lawyers owe a pro bono obligation to society, or that government officials are not entitled to seek increased compensation, or that corporate America has a social responsibility to its customers and a responsibility to its shareholders by keeping CEO compensation within reasonable boundaries.

Why, then, should public defenders not be entitled to come together as any other group of employees in order to seek better conditions of work? Does Moore mean that the government can give any compensation to public defenders and the public defenders should be grateful to receive it? What about district attorneys? If they were to organize, as some have, does Moore likewise believe that this is a violation of the citizens' constitutional rights?

This argument is a bit disingenuous and should be placed in its proper context. More to the point, why does Moore not argue that it is the responsibility of government and its citizens to make sure that defendants receive the best possible representation by compensating public defenders fairly and in accordance with compensation generally received in private law firms?

Edward Poll
Lawbiz Management
Venice