Ruling is a change of course on mandatory relief

To err is human; to forgive is Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b), at least in some situations. The most recent appellate opinion to address the "mandatory" relief provision of the statute is Urban Wildlands Group v. City of Los Angeles, 2017 DJDAR 3629 (April 17, 2017), authored by Justice Paul Turner. The case is significant, because the court's holding was the opposite of that reached in an earlier opinion authored by Justice Turner in In re Marriage of Hock & Gordon-Hock, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1438 (2000).

The Mandatory Relief Provision

Section 473(b) contains both discretionary and mandatory relief provisions. Discretionary relief is available to set aside a "judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding" resulting from "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." Mandatory relief is much more circumscribed, available only where an attorney's conduct has resulted in default, default judgment or dismissal, and the attorney submits a declaration of fault.

Although the discretionary provision of Section 473(b) was enacted in 1851, mandatory relief was not added to the statute until 1988. As originally enacted, the mandatory relief provision applied only to default judgments. In 1992, the statute was amended to provide mandatory relief from dismissals as well. However, the Legislature did not specify which types of dismissals were covered by the 1992 amendment.

The courts were quick to limit such dismissals to those which were "procedurally equivalent to a default." Peltier v. McCloud River R.R. Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1809, 1817 (1995). As explained by the court in Peltier, such a dismissal is one that results from a "failure to appear," such as at a dismissal motion. The courts precluded it from being used by attorneys as a "perfect escape hatch" from any act of malpractice, such as obtaining relief from dismissal for delay in prosecution or missing the statute of limitations. Huens v. Tatum, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259, 263-64 (1997).

Split of Authority

However, a split of authority arose between courts that applied mandatory relief to proceedings that resulted in the functional equivalent of dismissal and courts that strictly construed the statute as applying only to defaults, default judgments and dismissals, as specified in the statute.

In a series of three cases, the 2nd District Court of Appeal adopted the broader approach, holding that relief should be granted from judgments (not strictly dismissals) where litigants lost their day in court. Avila v. Chua, 57 Cal. App. 4th 860 (1997) (relief mandatory where summary judgment was granted after late-filed opposition stricken); Yeap v. Leake, 60 Cal. App.4th 591 (1997) (relief from judgment mandatory after counsel failed to attend court-ordered arbitration and file a request for trial de novo); Hock, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1438 (2000) (relief mandatory from judgment where attorney failed to appear at trial).

In contrast, a strict construction of the statute was adopted by the 3rd District Court of Appeal in English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 130, 138-40 (2001), wherein the court rejected the Avila court's application of mandatory relief to a summary judgment, and held that such relief was not available because a summary judgment is not a default, default judgment or dismissal, which are the only things specified in the statute for which mandatory relief is available. Over time, English became the predominant authority.

Urban Wildlands

Urban Wildlands may spell the death knell for the more liberal line of cases. In that administrative law proceeding, the plaintiff failed to lodge the administrative record in the trial court, resulting in judgment being entered in favor of the defendant. Seeking mandatory relief, the plaintiff maintained that the judgment was "the functional equivalent of a dismissal." Following English and its progeny, the appellate court held that mandatory relief was not available, because the judgment resulted from a trial in which the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence, which is not the same as a dismissal.

Urban Wildlands is particularly significant in settling the split of authority because Justice Turner also authored the opinion 17 years earlier in Hock, wherein the court utilized the broader approach to hold that mandatory relief was available to set aside a judgment entered after the litigant's attorney failed to appear at the time set for trial. In Urban Wildlands, Justice Turner went so far as to "disapprove" of the mandatory relief discussion in the Avila and Hock cases. In other words, he disapproved his own prior opinion and followed the stricter standard adopted by the court in English.

With the court's holding in Urban Wildlands, it appears that consensus has been reached on what had been a split of authority, demonstrating how the Court of Appeal's decision making process allows for course correction over time.