Court can clarify tolling of state law limitations

OCTOBER 2017 TERM

In Artis v. District of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme Court will get a chance to clarify a federal statute of limitations law governing state law claims asserted in federal court. In an original jurisdiction case, 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(d) provides that the applicable statute of limitations for state law claims over which the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

The case centers on what Congress meant by the word “tolled.” Artis claims that when the state statute of limitations is tolled pursuant to Section 1367(d), the limitations period ceases running, and, upon dismissal, Congress intended litigants to have the remaining balance of the limitations period, plus 30 days, in which to refile their claims in state court. The District of Columbia argues that Congress simply intended to remove the applicable state statute of limitations as a bar to litigants refiling their claims in state court, as long as they are filed within 30 days after the federal dismissal (assuming the statute of limitations would have otherwise run while the claims were pending in federal court).

Stephanie Artis was a former health inspector who filed a lawsuit against the District of Columbia in federal court more than a year after her termination, asserting claims for a violation of Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act for employment discrimination, as well as whistleblower and wrongful termination claims arising solely under D.C. law.

The district court granted summary judgment for the District of Columbia as to the Title VII claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims arising under D.C. law. In dismissing those claims, the court noted that Artis would not be prejudiced because Section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations “during the period of the case was here and for at least 30 days thereafter.”

Artis refiled her D.C. claims in superior court 59 days after the federal dismissal. The superior court dismissed the claims as time-barred based on the respective statutes of limitation and Section 1367(d). The D.C. Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the dismissal on limitations grounds, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Several courts across the country have taken conflicting positions on the scope of Section 1367(d). Maryland and Minnesota state courts, along with the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Section 1367(d) effectively imposes a “stop-clock,” which stops the applicable state statute of limitations for state law claims throughout a lawsuit’s entire duration in federal court and allows a plaintiff the stopped time plus 30 days to refile these claims in state court. The D.C. Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 59 Cal. 4th 618, 634 (2014), have held that Section 1367(d) provides a “grace period,” which prevents the state statute of limitations from expiring while the claims are pending in federal court, and allows a plaintiff only 30 additional days from the time the claims are dismissed to refile in state court. Wisconsin and 23 other states have filed an amicus brief in support of the District of Columbia.

The Supreme Court should affirm the decision below.

The starting place, as always, is the statutory text. As the statute does not define the term “toll[],” the court should interpret it according to its ordinary meaning. The District of Columbia points to an assortment of dictionary definitions ranging from the time Section 1367(d) was enacted to the present day, which show that “toll” consistently has been defined to mean “[t]o bar, defeat, or take away,” or “to remove the effect of.” Although Artis cites a secondary definition, which is “[t]o suspend or stop temporarily,” the District of Columbia points out that this definition is consistent with the primary definition, as a limitations statute simply has no effect during the period that it is “suspended” or “stopped temporarily.”

Thus, the ordinary meaning of the word “tolled” supports both the District of Columbia’s and California’s interpretation of the statute. At the very least, it cannot be said that the plain meaning of “tolled” unequivocally supports the Artis’ reading. And if the Supreme Court were to find the word “toll” ambiguous as used in Section 1367(d), the District of Columbia makes a convincing argument that the statutory context, purpose and legislative history confirm the District of Columbia’s interpretation.

Artis cites Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002), in support of her plain meaning argument, but that case is not as helpful as Artis claims. The Raygor court held that Section 1367(d) does not toll the statute of limitations for claims dismissed on 11th Amendment sovereign immunity grounds that were asserted in federal court against nonconsenting states. The court noted that if Section 1367(d) “applied in such circumstances, it would toll the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in federal court.” (Emphasis added.) But as Artis admits, Raygor did not consider how Section 1367(d) tolling operates (the crux of the current dispute); whether Raygor supports the Artis’ position still depends on what the court meant by “toll.” It is arguably equally plausible to read Raygor as supporting the District of Columbia’s argument: A state statute of limitations will not expire while a claim is pending in federal court and, once the claim is dismissed, for 30 days thereafter.

Additionally, the District of Columbia makes a colorable argument that Artis’ reading of Section 1367(d) raises federalism concerns, as it is not unequivocally clear that Congress intended to intrude on states’ historic function to define how their own limitations periods and tolling rules operate. And although the Supreme Court has held that Congress has the constitutional authority to toll state statutes of limitations generally, the question of how that tolling operates, and whether such operation intrudes on historic state functions, has not been yet decided.

Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the decision below. Although this issue is a relatively mundane one of procedure, the court’s decision has the potential to affect significantly how much time litigants have to refile state claims following a federal court’s denial of supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. And, since the California Supreme Court already has taken a side, California practitioners should be aware of Artis, as the court’s ruling could effectively change the law on this issue. Based on the foregoing, however, it appears that D.C. and California got it right. The case has been set for argument on Nov. 1.