Ruling says paying for college trumps paying spousal support

In 1972, the California Legislature changed the age of majority from 21 to 18. One of the consequences of that decision is that (absent a child with special needs), the court no longer has jurisdiction to order child support payable for a child who has attained the age of majority and graduated from high school, or who has attained the age of 19. As a practical matter, parents have no legal obligation to put their children through college. The issue that arose: Can the court take one party's decision to pay for the cost of a child's college education out of love and affection into account in determining the amount of spousal support?

Conflicting guidance has emanated from the Courts of Appeal. The fundamental issue is illustrated by the holdings in Marriage of Paul, 173 Cal. App. 3d 913 (1985), and Marriage of Serna, 83 Cal. App. 4th 482 (2000).

In Paul, the court ruled that the supported spouse's decision to pay for an adult child's college education was "not only justified but it is also commendable," and that it could properly be considered in determining the amount of spousal support. In contrast, the Serna court held that a court has no authority to order a parent to support an adult child, and criticized Paul on the ground that by reducing spousal support because the supporting party was paying for an adult child's college education, the supported spouse was indirectly being compelled to pay child support for an adult child.

In Maher v. Strawn, 2021 DJDAR 3800 (April 22, 2021), the 4th District Court of Appeal confronted the issue head-on and held that a supporting spouse's voluntary payments for a child's college education (in the approximate amount of $3,000 per month for the parties' son) could be taken into account in determining the amount of spousal support. In addition, the parties' daughter was graduating from high school, and planning to attend a private university at an estimated cost of $50,000 per year. The court observed that in Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76 (1979), a unanimous Supreme Court held that considering the supporting spouse's payment of $350 per month for an adult child's college education in setting the amount of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion. As the issue was addressed only obliquely, the law has remained unsettled for a good part of the last 50 years.

The amount of permanent spousal support is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. In exercising that discretion, the judge is required to analyze the statutory factors set forth in Family Code Section 4320. Those factors are as follows:

a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage;

b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party;

c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into accounting the supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living;

d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage;

e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party;

f) The duration of the marriage;

g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children and the custody of the party;

h) The age and health of the parties;

i) All documented evidence of any history of domestic violence;

j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party;

k) The balance of the hardships to each party;

l) The goal of the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time;

m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spousal;

n) Any other factors the Court determines are just and equitable.

The Maher court concluded that Section 4320 provided ample authority for its holding: "College expenses for adult children are among the circumstances to be considered in setting spousal support under Section 4320 subdivision (e) (each party's financial obligations), subdivision (k) (the "balance of the hardships to each party"), and subdivision (n) ("any other factors that are just and equitable").

During the course of its opinion, the court noted the following findings by the trial judge: The supported party, age 60, had a Ph.D. in biochemistry and was also a lawyer. For the last 10 years of the marriage, the supported party committed numerous acts of domestic violence. The supported party had sleep apnea, insomnia, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and severe depression, which the supported party testified prevented him from working, and took Valium "a couple times a day," along with anti-depressives, anti-anxiety drugs, and hydrocodone. He also drank 3-4 glasses of wine nightly. The court noted pointedly that "[h]e spends about $600 per month on wine -- three times his child support obligation."

The trial judge discounted the testimony of the supported party's medical expert on the ground that he was "too much of an advocate."

This combination of circumstances made it relatively easy for the court to reach its conclusion; indeed, the trial judge might have made the same spousal support order even if the supporting spouse was not paying for a child's college education, and it is doubtful that the order would have been considered an abuse of discretion.

This case also has broader implications. For example, Family Code Section 4400 provides that "an adult child shall, to the extent of the adult child's ability, support a parent who is in need and unable to self-maintain by work." Pursuant to Section 4404, in determining the amount to order for support, the court must consider the earning capacity, needs, obligations, assets, age and health, and standard of living of both parent and child, along with any other factors the court deems just and equitable. By extension, the principle enunciated in Maher justifies taking a party's voluntary payments for the support of a parent into account in determining the amount of spousal support, since it is both commendable and (unlike paying for an adult child's college education) a legal obligation.

On the one hand, in the Maher case, the supporting spouse was discharging a moral obligation to an adult child that was highlighted as an expense that could properly be considered in setting the amount of spousal support payable to a supported spouse who was thoroughly flawed and unsympathetic. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if the same rationale would justify reducing the amount of spousal support payable to a supported spouse who is already contributing to his or her own support, but who nonetheless needs every cent of the support to which he or she is entitled.

Under those circumstances, would the legal obligation to pay spousal support trump the moral obligation to pay for an adult child's college education?