California appellate court misunderstood purpose of Racial Justice Act

Further to K. Chike Odiwe's guest column ("Hoodies, racial stereotypes, and the California Racial Injustice Act," Feb. 29, 2024), discussing the trial court's failure to consider "implicit bias" in a Racial Justice Act hearing over the traffic stop of a Black man, may it be noted that the RJA expressly sanctions "exhibited bias," not "implicit bias." Penal Code Section 745.

The trial court denied defendant's motion as there was no evidence of exhibited bias, yet the court of appeals sent the motion back for rehearing to look into implicit bias. Tommy Bonds III v. Superior Court of San Diego County, D082187, 4th District, Division One, Feb. 14, 2029.

To get around the discrepancy between "exhibited" and "implicit," the appellate court reached back to legislative history: "In an uncodified section of Assembly Bill No. 2542, the Legislature explained, 'Implicit bias, although often unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar to intentional bias . ...'"

Conventional statutory interpretation, however, provides that unambiguous words in the final version of a statute control over legislative history. Thus, implicit bias is not part of the RJA. Judges are not mind readers.

The RJA prohibits "a sentence on the basis of race . ..." Those words add causation to the analysis. Yet race is not an element of crime. Wrongdoers commit crimes, not law enforcement officers who may "exhibit bias."

The Court of Appeals explained: "... the issue for the trial court was a simple one. Was Officer Cameron telling the truth when he said he did not know and could not see that the occupants of Bonds's vehicle were Black?" Decision-makers do not need the RJA to understand that witnesss bias contaminates credibility.

- James P. McBride

Attorney, Hayward, CA