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California Supreme Court,
Labor/Employment

Apr. 22, 2024

California Supreme Court broadly construes compensable ‘hours worked’

The court's decision in Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors provides helpful guidance to employers and employees on the meaning of "hours worked" under California wage and hour laws.

John J. Manier

Senior Counsel
Ballard, Rosenberg, Golper & Savitt, LLP LLP

Email: jmanier@brgslaw.com

See more...

California Supreme Court broadly construes compensable ‘hours worked’
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The California Supreme Court recently answered three certified questions on the meaning of the phrase “hours worked,” which appears in numerous state wage and hour laws. In Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors, 319 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 (Mar. 25, 2024), the court continued its practice of interpreting “hours worked” broadly, depending on the level of employer control over employee activities.

The case was brought by George Huerta, on behalf of himself and other employees of CSI Electrical Contractors, a company which provided “procurement, installation, construction, and testing services” at a solar power facility on privately-owned land in Monterey County. Huerta and his fellow employees were covered by Wage Order No. 16, which governs wages, hours, and working conditions in the construction, drilling, logging, and mining industries.

To enter the worksite, employees used private vehicles to pass a guard shack on a designated road and drove several miles to a Security Gate, where they formed a long line waiting for guards to perform required security checks. This included scanning each employee’s badge and sometimes peering inside vehicles and truck beds.

The drive between the Security Gate to employee parking lots took about 10-15 minutes each way. The speed limit on the access road was 20 miles per hour, with occasional delays to ensure the road and the parking lots were clear of endangered species that lived in the area. Employees were prohibited from honking their horns, playing music that could be heard outside their vehicles, or otherwise disturbing wildlife. They also could not drive on other roads near the facility, nor could they walk or bike to the parking lots.

Employees were not paid for time spent at the Security Gate or driving from that gate to employee parking lots. Employees also were not paid for 30-minute meal periods established under collective bargaining agreements, even though they were not allowed to leave the site and were instructed to spend meal periods at a designated area.

Huerta filed a wage and hour class action in Monterey County Superior Court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Huerta successfully moved for class certification, but the district court later granted summary judgment for CSI. The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals certified three questions on state wage-and-hour law to the California Supreme Court, which agreed to answer them.

First, the court concluded that employee time spent waiting for the security check before exiting the Security Gate is compensable as “hours worked” under Wage Order No. 16. The court followed an earlier decision where it found Apple employees were entitled to compensation for time spent “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees.” Friekin v. Apple Inc., 8 Cal.5th 1038, 1042 (2020). The rationale is that “employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” Id.

Although Huerta and other CSI employees spent their waiting time in personal vehicles, the court concluded this did not convert the time into commuting time, which is not compensable. Instead, the court concluded “Huerta was subject to CSI’s control” during this “exit security procedure.” It also noted that California wage-and-hour law does “not incorporate the federal de minimis doctrine” or excuse the payment of wages for small amounts of time simply because they “are administratively difficult to record.”

Second, the court found the time driving between the Security Gate and employee parking lots does not constitute “hours worked,” but may still be compensable as “employer-mandated travel” under Wage Order No. 16. The court reasoned that CSI’s “imposition of ordinary workplace rules on employees during their drive to the worksite in a personal vehicle” did not create enough employer control to transform this commuting time to “hours worked.”

However, Wage Order No. 16 specifically requires compensation for “employer-mandated travel that occurs after the first location where the employee’s presence is required by the employer.” The court held this provision applies when the employee’s presence “is required for an employment-related reason other than the practical necessity of reaching the worksite.” As examples, the court listed employees being “required to pick up work supplies, receive work orders or other directives, or perform work before traveling to a second jobsite.” The court expressed “no view on whether the Security Gate was ‘the first location’ where Huerta’s presence was required by CSI,” and noted conflicting evidence on this issue.

Third, even where a collective bargaining agreement complies with California law and provides for an “unpaid meal period,” that time remains compensable as “hours worked” if the employee is prohibited from leaving the premises or a designated area, and is prevented “from engaging in otherwise feasible personal activities.” A meal period qualifies as “off-duty” only if employees are free to use the time for their own purposes. This principle applies to “remote worksites,” where “there is a meaningful difference” between being required to remain at a designated location “and being allowed to return to one’s personal vehicle or take a walk,” where the employee could “make personal phone calls, take a nap, or simply enjoy a moment of quiet.”

The court expressed no view on whether CSI’s restrictions on Huerta precluded him from engaging in activities he could have undertaken if permitted to leave the premises. However, it ruled that if Huerta is entitled to compensation for his meal period, he may bring a claim under Labor Code section 1194, which authorizes recovery for “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee.”

The California Supreme Court’s Huerta decision provides helpful guidance to employers and employees. It also reaffirms the broad interpretation California courts have long given to our state’s wage-and-hour laws.

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