CA Supreme Court upholds trial court’s dismissal of strict liability municipal code violations against landlord

In Emily Wheeler v. Superior Court (Supreme Court No. S272850), the California Supreme Court reversed the appellate division of the Superior Court, which in turn had reversed a Los Angeles County trial court’s dismissal of municipal code violations against a landlord under Penal Code § 1385. Section 1385 empowers trial courts to dismiss criminal charges “in furtherance of justice.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court was permitted to consider, among other things, Wheeler’s innocent state of mind in dismissing what the parties agreed were strict liability offenses which did not require a culpable mental state as an element.

Wheeler and her son, the property owners, were charged with multiple counts alleging that they operated an unlicensed marijuana business specifically, and an unlawful establishment more generally, on property in the Los Angeles city limits. They were additionally charged with maintaining a structure without applying for all necessary permits. Essentially, all of the charges alleged the same conduct: the Wheelers leased the property they owned to a marijuana business which was not properly permitted. The tenant was also named in the municipal code counts but was additionally charged with unlawfully selling cannabis under the California Health and Safety Code.

Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the municipal code provisions were vague and overbroad. She cited to the trial court’s Section 1385 authority to dismiss an action on its own motion in furtherance of justice. Wheeler primarily relied on the fact that she was 85 years old, had no prior criminal history whatsoever, and, critically, was merely the property owner. She asserted that she had no real connection to the operation of the business and that the tenant had in fact deceived her by operating a “covert” marijuana business without her knowledge or consent.

The People argued that Section 1385 motions cannot originate from the defense and, even if they could, a dismissal would frustrate the strict liability purpose of the municipal code offenses and the city’s efforts to regulate marijuana sales. While the People provided additional evidence about undercover purchases from the location which implicated co-defendants, they did not dispute the central contention that Wheeler was personally unaware of the marijuana activity. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Wheeler appeared in a wheelchair. The trial court inquired of the People whether there was any evidence that Wheeler had contact with the offending tenant. The People conceded that there was no evidence connecting Wheeler to the business but for her mere ownership of the parcel.

The trial court denied Wheeler’s motion, agreeing that Section 1385 motions cannot originate from the defense. However, it then immediately granted its own motion under Section 1385. The trial court cited Wheeler’s age, lack of record, and complete lack of personal knowledge of the illegality of the marijuana business. The appellate division reversed, finding that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal amounted to a “disagreement with the law” or a “disapproval of the impact of the law” on Wheeler by considering her mental state in a crime that required no mental state to be proven. After further petitions for rehearing and an affirmance by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted review.

The Supreme Court reviewed the history of Section 1385, concluding that a trial court has broad inherent powers to dismiss an action in any situation in which the legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent. The only limitation on this authority is that the dismissal be in furtherance of justice. That phrase in turn requires a balancing of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society as represented by the People. Justice, the Supreme Court explained, must be defined as justice within, or intrinsic to, the system of law to which the defendant is subject to prevent any judge’s idiosyncratic view of moral justice to be elevated above the legislature’s preferences.

The Supreme Court turned to the municipal code sections at issue and found that they provided a wide variety of punishment from noncriminal sanctions up through misdemeanor charges, like those brought against Wheeler. This range of punishment indicates that the legislature, or in this case the city authorities which enacted the code, contemplated a wide variety of offenders from more culpable to less culpable. Wheeler, by any fair standard, would fall on the far end of the least culpable offenders given her background and her total lack of knowing or willful conduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned, it was not antipathy toward the law itself which motivated the trial court’s dismissal under Section 1385, but rather a consideration of the character of the charges themselves. Wheeler was one of the least culpable defendants reached by the terms of the municipal code, and yet was subject to the most serious form of sanction provided by the code. Under those circumstances, a dismissal was in furtherance of justice.

Our office has represented numerous landlords facing criminal prosecution for unlawful activity on their property they were unaware of. The conduct of the tenants ranged from storing unlawful chemicals leading to an explosion to selling or cultivating marijuana. In each instance, our firm successfully obtained judicial diversion pursuant to Penal Code Section 1001.95 and secured a dismissal within 6-12 months. The Wheeler case provides a further avenue to obtain a dismissal of criminal charges for an innocent landlord even faster pursuant to Penal Code Section 1385.