July 2024

DISBARMENT

John Gant Bradley

State Bar #264816, San Francisco (May 3, 2024)

Bradley was disbarred by default after he failed to participate in the consolidated conviction matter involving misdemeanors for obstructing an officer (Cal. Penal Code §69) and battery on an officer (Cal. Penal Code §243(b)).

The State Bar Court found that disbarment was warranted, as all procedural requirements had been met: proper service of the notices of hearing, reasonable diligence in notifying Bradley of the proceedings before default was entered, proper entry of default, and a satisfactory basis for discipline. It was also satisfied that Bradley did not move to have the default entered against him set aside or vacated.

In one of the underlying incidents at issue: Police responding to a public disturbance call arrested Bradley for public intoxication. He resisted arrest--struggling while being handcuffed and being placed in the patrol car at the scene, kicking the car once inside, spitting on one of the officer's heads and threatening to kill him.

In the second incident, Bradley was again intoxicated in public while on criminal probation requiring him to abstain from consuming alcohol. While being placed under arrest, he yelled and cursed at the arresting officers--kicking and squeezing them.

There were other disciplinary matters pending against Bradley at the time he was disbarred.

John H. Donboli

State Bar #205218, San Diego (May 3, 2024)

Donboli was disbarred by default after he failed to participate, either in person or through counsel, in his disciplinary proceedings.

He was charged with committing 11 ethical violations related to three client matters. They included: improperly terminating representation, failing to maintain records of client funds held, and failing to participate in the State Bar's investigation of the wrongdoing alleged; two counts each of failing to provide an accounting of client funds, and failing to refund unearned advanced fees; and three counts of failing to maintain client funds in trust. An additional count involved moral turpitude: willfully misappropriating client funds.

The State Bar Court determined that Donboli did not move to have the default ultimately entered against him set aside or vacated, and that misconduct he committed warranted disbarment as recommended.

Thomas Vincent Johnston

State Bar #82019, Woodland Hills (May 10, 2024)

Johnston was disbarred by default after he failed to participate, either in person or through counsel, in his disciplinary proceeding.

In a telephone conversation with a deputy from the State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel, Johnston was notified of the disciplinary charges filed against him--and also that his response was past due. He provided a current email address, to which documents related to the proceeding were sent, but did not file a response to the motion for entry of default in the matter, nor did he move to have the default entered against him set aside or vacated.

As a result, the factual allegations in the charge against Johnston were admitted and deemed true. He was found culpable of violating a court order by failing to file a declaration of compliance as required in an earlier discipline order (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 9.20).

Johnston had one prior record of professional discipline at the time he was disbarred.

Shane Felton Loomis

State Bar #247574, Westlake Village (May 17, 2024)

Loomis was summarily disbarred. He earlier pled nolo contendere to the felony of committing gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Cal. Penal Code § 191.5(a)), with admitted special allegations of committing a serious felony by inflicting great bodily injury on another person (Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(8)) and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .15% or more (Cal. Veh. Code §23578).

The State Bar's Hearing Department determined that the facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction involved moral turpitude, which Loomis appealed. The State Bar Court panel on appeal affirmed the finding of moral turpitude--and thus, found the conviction met the requirements for a mandatory summary disbarment.

The factual background: Loomis drove to three different locations one evening, consuming alcohol at each one. After consuming two drinks at a dinner with family members, he texted a woman he had been dating, inviting her to join him for the evening. The two met at a restaurant, where both consumed a pint of beer. They then left and went to a nearby liquor store with an adjoining tasting room, where they each drank at least one glass of wine. Loomis later testified he had no recollection of events that occurred after the two left the tasting room.

The evidence showed that he then drove nearly 30 miles per hour faster than the posted speed limit, lost control of the car he was driving, and collided with a large tree. The impact was so intense that the front passenger seat in which his companion was sitting was ripped from the floorboard; she was pronounced dead from her injuries a short time later. Loomis was extracted from the car, and transported to the hospital; a test revealed he had a blood alcohol content of .18%. He was sentenced to a four-year term in state prison, and released after 14 months.

The hearing judge had acknowledged there was no published precedent providing guidance as to whether a conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated involves moral turpitude. The panel on appeal focused on the moral turpitude finding, reviewing relevant case law on DUI and alcohol-related convictions. After acknowledging that a conviction for driving while intoxicated does not involve moral turpitude per se, it analyzed related cases in some detail. It concluded that Loomis' conviction involved moral turpitude because it demonstrates "a flagrant disrespect for the law and societal norms," and breached the duties owed to the now-deceased passenger and to society. And it noted that the conviction in the instant case involved gross negligence, requiring a lesser showing of "bad facts and circumstances" to demonstrate moral turpitude.

Spencer Freeman Smith

State Bar #236587, Menlo Park (May 10, 2024)

Smith was disbarred after appealing an earlier disciplinary order that also recommended disbarment.

He had earlier pled nolo contendere to the felony of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death (Cal. Veh. Code § 20001) and vehicular manslaughter (Cal. Penal Code § 192(c)(2)).

On appeal, the State Bar Court panel determined that the underlying conviction was final, that the facts and circumstances surrounding the crimes at issue involved moral turpitude, and that mitigating factors were not predominant or compelling.

In the underlying incident, Smith, who was driving on a four-lane highway, struck an individual who was riding or walking in the road with a bicycle. The individual suffered severe trauma to his head and body, and was pronounced dead at the scene. After striking the individual, Smith did not stop or call for an ambulance. The exterior of Smith's car was severely damaged, the windshield was shattered, and there was shattered glass inside it, as well as hair from the deceased in the dashboard and speaker. Smith drove home, more than four miles, and parked the damaged car in his garage. Two days after the incident, when contacted by an investigating officer, Smith misleading said he "hit a rock, or possibly a deer, or something."

While serving on electric home monitoring after being found guilty of the crimes charged, Smith tested positive for cocaine and its metabolite. Shortly after, he was placed on interim suspension from the practice of law.

The final disciplinary disposition was abated pending resolution of Smith's appeal, but the abatement was terminated after the State Bar Court deemed the convictions were final. It also found that the facts and circumstances surrounding the criminal convictions involved moral turpitude--underscoring that Smith "knew or should have known that it was unlawful to hit a pedestrian and flee the scene" and that he was "deceitful" and "dishonest and misleading" when speaking with police and insurance investigators. It also noted that Smith "exhibited further contempt for the law" by violating his criminal probation just two weeks after it was imposed.

In aggravation, Smith had a prior record of discipline, and demonstrated a lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for his wrongdoing.

In mitigation, he entered into a narrow stipulation regarding the procedural history of the criminal conviction and agreeing that the elements of the convicted offenses were conclusively proven.

Lyndol James Wilkins

State Bar #195103, Rancho Murieta (May 10, 2024)

Wilkins was disbarred by default after he failed to participate in his disciplinary proceeding despite receiving actual notice of it.

The State Bar Court found that all procedural requirements had been met and that there was an adequate factual basis for discipline in the current case. In addition, it noted that Smith did not move to have the default ultimately entered against him set aside or vacated.

Wilkins had earlier been convicted of grand theft (Cal. Penal Code § 487(a))--an offense involving moral turpitude as a matter of law. Facts underlying that conviction: Wilkins purchased a vacuum cleaner, then returned to the store that same day emptyhanded, where he took another vacuum from the store and completed a return of it. Weeks later, he repeated the same purchase and return procedure with an electric toothbrush, printer, router, and laptop.

The criminal charge ultimately filed against Wilkins was based on his theft of the laptop, which was valued at $1,449.99.

There was one pending disciplinary investigation against Wilkins, which had been abated, when he was disbarred.

SUSPENSION

Juan Miquel Bernardo

State Bar #276675, Portland, Oregon (May 10, 2024)

Bernardo was suspended from practicing law for 120 days (with credit given for a period of inactive enrollment) and placed on probation for one year after he successfully completed the State Bar's Alternative Discipline Program (ADP).

He had earlier stipulated to being culpable of three charges: failing to comply with a court order imposing compliance requirements (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 9.20) and two counts of failing to comply with conditions attached to disciplinary probation orders.

Bernardo submitted a letter from a licensed psychologist in addition to a statement establishing a nexus between his substance abuse and the charges against him. He was accepted into the ADP, and he also signed a Lawyer Assistance monitoring Plan.

In a proceeding in which the charges were consolidated, the State Bar Court gave aggravating weight for Bernardo's two prior records of discipline and for engaging in multiple acts of misconduct. He was allotted mitigating weight for entering into a stipulation and for suffering from extreme emotion difficulties during the time of the misconduct. In addition, the court considered his successful completion of the ADP in the instant matter--and imposed the lower level of discipline, as set out in an earlier confidential statement.

Samuel Alberto Ceballos

State Bar #292438, Los Angeles (May 3, 2024)

Ceballos was suspended for 120 days and placed on probation for two years after he stipulated to committing 31 acts of professional misconduct related to 19 separate client matters.

His wrongdoing included: failing to represent a client diligently, failing to promptly release client files after being requested to do so, and failing to promptly refund unearned advanced fees; four counts of failing to obtain clients' written consents before accepting payment for legal services from a third party; nine counts of failing to provide clients with a proper accounting of their funds; and 15 counts of failing to deposit clients' advanced fees into a trust account.

Most of the misconduct involved Ceballos' mishandling of client funds. In numerous cases, he deposited the advanced fees received into his operating account instead of a client trust account as required. Another common transgression was failing to provide clients with an accounting of their funds when asked--tendering accountings only three or fours year later.

In aggravation, Ceballos committed multiple acts of wrongdoing.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, took remedial measures--including adding a case management software system to his practice that was aimed at preventing similar misconduct in the future, and was given nominal mitigating weight for having practiced law for six years without a record of misconduct.

Richard Lewis Coberly

State Bar #242093, Covina (May 3, 2024)

Coberly was suspended from the practice of law for 30 days and placed on probation for one year after he stipulated to committing 10 acts of professional misconduct related to three separate client matters.

He was culpable of: failing to respond to reasonable client inquiries and failing to inform his client of significant case developments; two counts each of failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing clients and appearing as an attorney without the authority to do so, and; three counts of failing to uphold the laws and constitution. His wrongdoing also included an act involving moral turpitude: knowingly engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.

In one matter, Coberly assumed representation of a client after he bought a retiring attorney's business. However, he failed to sign and file the completed substitution of attorney form he was tendered, and failed to incorporate the minor revisions the client had made on a declaration required to complete a default judgment. Over the next couple months, Coberly did not respond to the client's inquiries about the status of her case, nor did he appear at a scheduled hearing in the matter. She terminated his representation. Coberly was then placed on "administrative inactive" status after ignoring the State Bar's warnings that he had not complied with his MCLE requirements. However, he subsequently appeared by telephone at an order to show cause hearing in the case.

A second case followed a substantially similar fact pattern, with Coberly again failing to file a substitution of counsel form. The case he was supposed to have taken over from the retired attorney continued after Coberly was placed on inactive status. However, despite being ineligible to practice law, he filed a motion, and appeared telephonically at a hearing on that client's behalf--without informing her either of his appearance or of his suspended status. After being reinstated, the client was sanctioned due to Coberly's failure to respond to discovery requests, failure to appear at an ex parte hearing, and failure to appear at a hearing on the opposition's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted that unopposed motion.

The third case also involved Coberly's actions while on inactive status due to his MCLE noncompliance. Despite that, he appeared by telephone at a hearing in a civil matter for another client, and failed to appear at a hearing to address his unauthorized appearance. The client had requested the hearing after learning that he was not eligible to practice, but had failed to inform her.

In aggravation, Coberly committed multiple acts of misconduct that substantially harmed his clients, the public, and the administration of justice.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, had practiced law discipline-free for nearly 13 years, presented evidence of his good character in the form of letters from 12 individuals taken from a range in the legal and general communities, and suffered from a mental disability--now under effective treatment--during the time of the misconduct. He was also allotted limited mitigating weight for evidence suggesting he performed a limited scope of pro bono services.

George Martin Derieg

State Bar #238193, Alameda (May 31, 2024)

Derieg was suspended from practicing law for 15 months and placed on probation for two years.

The Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC) of the State Bar had appealed the hearing judge's recommendation of 15 months of actual suspension, urging disbarment or an actual suspension of two years. However, in a subsequent petition to the California Supreme Court, the OCTC acknowledged that it was not seeking a change in the discipline imposing 15 months of suspension, but that it sought clarification for future cases of the case authority regarding the propriety of alleging both a violation of the duty to support the constitution and laws (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(a)) when a violation of an overlapping rule of professional conduct is also charged--in this case, collecting an illegal fee. The panel demurred, citing precedent that concluded "little, if any, purpose is served by duplicative allegations of misconduct." (Bates v. State Bar, 51 Cal. 3d at 1060 (1990))

In the present case, Derieg was found culpable of seeking to mislead a judge, collecting an illegal fee, and two counts of failing to deposit client funds in a trust account. Additional counts involved moral turpitude: making a material misrepresentation to a court, and misappropriating client funds.

In the underlying matter, Derieg represented a client in a probate case--requesting his legal fee by directly billing the escrow company after the sale of some real estate, promising to deposit the funds in his client trust account. However, he deposited the $14,300 he received into his business account instead, ultimately spending the entire amount on expenses unrelated to that client's case. In preparing a subsequent accounting, Derieg asked for payment of legal fees even though they had already been paid, intending not to double bill, but to "ratify" the fees he had already received. Another attorney was hired to review the final account and petition in the probate matter. She asked the court to redistribute the attorneys' fees and asserted Dereig's share should be reduced due to the delay in administering the estate. He paid immediately, and the order to show cause was discharged.

In aggravation, Derieg committed multiple acts of wrongdoing.

In mitigation, he had practiced law discipline-free for approximately 11 years, cooperated in the State Bar's investigation of his wrongdoing, submitted evidence of his good character and performance of community services as attested in letters written by 53 individual witnesses--eight of whom also testified at trial, and demonstrated remorse for the transgression of mishandling client funds.

The panel on appeal noted in its opinion that the facts in the instant matter represented "an effective presentation of mitigation in support of a downward departure" in discipline. It noted: "Where, as here, a respondent exhibits overwhelming and convincing mitigation, discipline for even very serious misconduct may be mitigated."

Randy Godin

State Bar #239411, Beverly Hills (May 3, 2024)

Godin was suspended for two years and placed on probation for three years after he stipulated to committing 12 acts of professional misconduct related to one client case and a State Bar investigation.

In the client matter, his wrongdoing included: failing to inform a client of a significant case development, holding himself out as entitled to practice law when he was not an active member of the State Bar, as well as actually practicing while not entitled--misconduct involving moral turpitude; and three counts of collecting illegal fees.

In the State Bar investigation case, he was culpable of failing to comply with probation conditions and five counts of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, which involved moral turpitude.

By order of the California Supreme Court, Godin was subject to a disciplinary order that included one year of actual suspension, effective in April 2020. During his period of suspension, Godin provided advice to a client seeking legal help with a landlord/tenant matter. He also billed the client for work on drafting a related trust and a sublease, as well as for a separate prenuptial agreement and marital trust. He sent two invoices on his law firm letterhead, billing a total of $3,275--which the client paid. Godin also held himself out as a practicing attorney during negotiations with counsel over prenuptial agreement terms.

In addition, during his period of suspension, Godin submitted five required quarterly reports under penalty of perjury that falsely stated that he had "complied with all provisions of the California State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct." In fact, he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and had billed and collected fees for doing so.

In aggravation, Godin had a prior record of discipline, committed multiple acts of misconduct in the instant matter, and showed indifference to his rectification by repeatedly making false statements in his quarterly reports to the State Bar.

In mitigation, he entered into a prefiling stipulation and submitted documentation of physical and emotional symptoms--now substantially addressed--which he suffered during the time of the misconduct. He was also allotted some mitigating weight for letters attesting to his good character written by four individuals who did not represent a range in the legal and general communities.

Vyacheslav Kuznyetsov

State Bar #290407, Van Nuys (May 3, 2024)

Kuznyetsov was suspended for one year and placed on probation for two years--with credit given for the period of inactive enrollment that was in effect from February 22, 2022 through August 10, 2023. This discipline was imposed after he successfully completed the conditions imposed in the State Bar's Alternative Discipline Program (ADP).

Kuznyetsov had earlier stipulated that he had failed to comply with conditions imposed in an earlier disciplinary order. Specifically, he failed to timely file a quarterly written report and underlying criminal probation matter reports, as well as a final report. The State Bar Court allotted aggravating weight in the case based on Kuznyetsov's two prior records of discipline and the fact he had engaged in multiple acts of misconduct in the case at issue. In mitigation, he entered into a stipulation and provided evidence of his good character. In addition, the court now considered his successful completion of the ADP as a further mitigating circumstance.

Zein E. Obagi, Jr.

State Bar #264139, Redondo Beach (May 3, 2024)

Obagi was suspended from the practice of law for two years and placed on probation for three years after being found culpable of committing eight acts of professional misconduct.

In one case, his wrongdoing included: failing to obtain written consents before jointly representing clients, representing a client with adverse interests to a former client without obtaining prior written consent, failing to notify a client of settlement funds received, failing to render an accounting of client funds, failing to maintain client funds in a trust account, violating fiduciary duties to a client, and misappropriating client funds--an act involving moral turpitude. In another case, he was culpable of making misrepresentations to a judge--which also involved moral turpitude.

At the outset of its opinion in the discipline case, the State Bar Court noted that its findings were based on "three vast binding stipulations of facts," as well as additional trial testimony and evidence. No less than eight lawyers eventually became involved in handling the various disputes and litigation involved in the case.

On the underlying matters, Obagi was hired by two partners who were selling a marijuana dispensary; he did not first discuss possible adverse consequences of representing the duo. Their fee agreement specified that any monetary recovery would be deposited into Obagi's client trust account, pending resolution of any disputes, with both clients promptly notified.

One of the clients then informed Obagi that the partners had a dispute, and he was removing himself from negotiations. Obagi then terminated his representation of that client, citing the conflict of interest between the two partners. The two former partners then engaged in litigation, seeking damages and declaratory relief related to the sale of their business. Eventually, a settlement was reached in which the buyer of the business agreed to pay $1.9 million minus unpaid taxes to Obagi's remaining client, who agreed to pay $515,000 to his former partner; Obagi insisted that settlement funds be deposited into his client trust account--and he agreed to pay out the $515,000 settlement share from the deposited amount.

Before the settlement funds were received, Obagi and his client began to dispute over the legal fees owed; the client hired additional counsel to assist in resolving the matter. After receiving the settlement funds, Obagi wired $1,699,715 to the new counsel, holding back the remainder for his attorney's fees; he did not research the obligation to pay the $515,000 promised to his former client. The new counsel eventually transitioned into the role of mediating the fee dispute. As part of their agreement, counsel transferred $957,048 of the $1,699,715 total back into Obagi's client trust account. Obagi later testified he was "perplexed" and "confused" by the deposit, and insisted no one made him aware of the need to pay the outstanding $515,000 to his former client.

Obagi's former client then sued him for malpractice; the superior court found, inter alia, that Obagi had breached his fiduciary duty to the former client. The funds in the client trust account remained in dispute--eventually the impetus for additional litigation.

In aggravation, Obagi committed multiple acts of wrongdoing--some of which severely harmed his client, and demonstrated indifference toward rectifying or atoning for the consequences of his misconduct.

In mitigation, he presented declarations from 14 individuals taken from a range in the community--all of whom attested to his good character, and was allotted minimal mitigating weight for having practiced law discipline-free for approximately seven years. He was also given moderate weight for evidence of performing community service on a record that provided no specific quantifiable information about the level of the service, as well as for cooperating with investigating authorities by entering extensive stipulations as to facts--though the court noted that he "undermined the stipulated facts throughout the four-day trial."
The State Bar Court recommended two years of actual suspension, finding his aggravation and mitigation "roughly equal," but noting "Obagi's transgressions are considerable."

Elana Thibault

State Bar #302572, Oakland (May 31, 2024)

Thibault was suspended for 30 days and placed on probation for one year after the State Bar Court panel affirmed that recommendation of discipline on appeal.

She was found culpable of engaging in representation adverse to a former client, violating a court order to pay sanctions, and failing to report the sanctions imposed to the State Bar as required.

Some of the events relevant to this disciplinary matter occurred before Thibault became involved, when a client consulted a woman who ran a firm in Fremont, advertising herself as "an Indian American U.S. immigration lawyer" and "founder and attorney" of a "law group." In fact, she was not licensed to practice law in California. The client, who believed the woman was a licensed attorney, paid a retainer of $5,000 for help with a pending marital dissolution petition.

Several years later, Thibault became employed with the Fremont firm, and was assigned to represent the client's former husband in resolving issues with child custody, support, and property division in the case. The attorney the wife had hired sent Thibault a cautionary letter--warning her that a conflict existed in the representation, and including a copy of the $5,000 retainer check the client had paid to the Fremont firm.

Thibault withdrew from the case, and eventually ended her employment with the Fremont firm, though she continued to share office space there while operating as a sole practitioner. The former husband then hired Thibault to help resolve marital property issues related to the dissolution case; Thibault did not seek an informed written consent about the conflict from the wife, who was the initial client. Opposing counsel moved to disqualify Thibault.

During the disqualification hearing, Thibault attempted to introduce two documents during cross-examination that were related to the wife's initial consultation that she had retrieved from the Fremont firms' database. She was ultimately disqualified and ordered to pay $5,000 in sanctions, with the court emphasizing its finding that "an attorney-client relationship" had existed between the Fremont firm's owner and the wife, who believed she had hired a licensed attorney. Thibault unsuccessfully appealed the sanctions order, and eventually paid eight months after it became final.

In aggravation, Thibault committed multiple acts of misconduct, and showed indifference toward rectifying the consequences of her wrongdoing.

In mitigation, she was allotted nominal weight for character evidence submitted by four individuals who were not taken from a range in the community and were unaware of the full charges at issue, as well as for evidence of pro bono work that was limited to her own testimony and lacked specificity.

The State Bar Court panel emphasized that the case presented a lesson for other practitioners, noting: "This case underscores the need for attorneys to understand the broad scope of our conflicts of interest rules, which require the avoidance of adverse interests, and it demonstrates the perils that can result when an attorney is not careful in following the requirements of these rules."

Richard Van Vermazen
State Bar #153029, San Diego (May 3, 2024)

Van Vermazen was suspended from practicing law for 30 days and placed on probation for two years after he stipulated to committing four acts of professional misconduct related to a single case.

His wrongdoing included representing multiple clients with both potential and actual conflicting interests and entering into an aggregate settlement of their claims--all without first obtaining their informed written consent, and failing to return disputed settlement funds to his firm's client trust account.

In the underlying matter, Van Vermazen was initially hired to represent a woman injured in a car accident who was pursuing an action against the driver of the car; two additional passengers were also injured.

The client's case was eventually consolidated with a separate personal injury case initiated by one of the other passengers. In the course of the litigation, Van Vermazen became aware that the driver had a $3 million total insurance policy limit. He then reached an agreement with the passenger's counsel to have his firm associate on the lawsuit, but failed to obtain his initial client's consent regarding the joint representation.

Van Vermazen sent an email to the driver's counsel conveying that the two plaintiffs were making a joint offer to settle for $3 million, with the allocation to be decided in binding arbitration--again, without securing the initial client's written consent to the settlement amount and arbitration. After the other passenger sought declaratory relief in the form of allocation of the aggregate settlement, Van Vermazen informed the initial client he could no longer represent her because of the joint interests at stake. She hired new counsel, and disputed Van Vermazen's right to any attorney fees. He deposited four settlement checks totaling $3 million into his client trust account. Some months later, the arbitrator issued a binding judgment awarding $2.25 million to the initial client and $750,000 to the other injured passenger. Despite the dispute over any fees due him Van Vermazen withdrew $837,406.17 as his fee, depositing that amount into his operating account.

The initial client then sued Van Vermazen, and a jury found in her favor on claims of breach of contract, negligent breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional breach of fiduciary duty. It awarded a total of $754,725 in costs and damages, which Van Vermazen subsequently satisfied.

In aggravation, Van Vermazen had a prior record of discipline, committed multiple acts of wrongdoing, and harmed a client whose recovery was significantly delayed--and obtained only after hiring new counsel, and proceeding through arbitration and a trial.

In mitigation, he entered into a prefiling stipulation and submitted eight letters from the legal and general communities who attested to his good character and work with nonprofits.

Nicholas John Paul Wagner

State Bar #109455, Fresno (May 10, 2024)

Wagner was suspended from the practice of law for 30 days and placed on probation for one year after he stipulated to committing five acts of professional misconduct related to two separate client matters.

His wrongdoing included: failing to promptly refund unearned advanced fees after being requested to do so in one case, and in the other: failing to perform legal services with diligence, failing to communicate significant case developments to a client, and failing to deposit client funds in an appropriate trust account, and improperly withdrawing from representation.

In one case, Wagner was hired to represent a client to handle IRS matters--accepting $15,000 as a retainer. He deposited the retainer funds in a client trust account, but regularly billed the client for services as the matter progressed. She paid all invoices, then asked for a return of the retainer after the work was completed. Wagner agreed to return the funds, but failed to do so until approximately 10 months later, after the client had filed a complaint against him with the State Bar. As a condition imposed in the disciplinary process, Wagner was required to attend the State Bar Client Trust Accounting School, which he failed to do.

In the other matter, Wagner was retained by another client for help with an IRS matter. She sent a draft of a request for relief that she had completed, asking for his changes and revisions. A few months later, he faxed a protest letter to the IRS, but failed to include any request for relief form. He did not respond to the client's inquiries about the status of the filing or about the case in general. He eventually filed a petition with the IRS seeking a redetermination of the client's alleged tax deficiency and forwarded a copy of the IRS petition to the client's accountant, but took no additional action on the matter. The client subsequently received an invoice from the IRS for tax deficiency. Wagner filed for and was granted a continuance in the tax matter, indicating the client may be seeking new counsel. He did not inform the client about the continuance, nor did he file a motion to be relieved as counsel in the case.

In aggravation, Wagner committed multiple acts of wrongdoing and showed indifference to the import of his disciplinary matter by filing to abide by the conditions the State Bar imposed.

In mitigation, he entered into a prefiling stipulation and had practiced law for more than 27 years without a record of discipline.

PROBATION

Hugh Jeffrey Grant

State Bar #156429, Manhattan Beach (May 10, 2024)

Grant was placed on probation for one year after he stipulated to earlier pleading no contest to one misdemeanor count of driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or more (Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(b)), with an admitted prior conviction for that same offense within 10 years (Cal. Veh. Code § 23540). An additional count was dismissed as part of the plea negotiations in the case.

In the underlying matter, a police officer observed Grant drive across a double yellow divider line, and conducted a traffic stop. Grant performed unsuccessfully in a field sobriety test conducted at the scene, and a later breathalyzer test indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .20%.

The matter was referred to the State Bar's Hearing Department for both a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed if the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline. It found no moral turpitude, but recommended the discipline imposed in the instant case.

In aggravation, Grant had a prior record of discipline.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation.

John Joseph VanDervoort

State Bar #54720, Chico (May 10, 2024)

VanDervoort was placed on probation for three years after he stipulated to earlier pleading nolo contendere to one count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or higher (Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(b)) with an additional factual stipulation that his actual blood alcohol concentration was .13% in the instant matter.

VanDervoort drove his vehicle to a fast food restaurant, where he attempted to order food via the drive-through lane. However, his speech was incoherent and difficult to understand. After he behaved flirtatiously with a female employee at the drive-through window, a male employee was sent out to take his order. The male was also unable to discern VanDervoort's order, told him he was too intoxicated to drive, and should park his car; he hen summoned law enforcement.

Though VanDervoort told the investigating officer he had consumed only two alcoholic beverages two hours prior to the stop, he was confused about the time, and attempted unsuccessfully to put the keys in the ignition and leave the scene. After being arrested and transported to the police station, his blood alcohol concentration was tested--with results of 13% and 14%.

In aggravation, VanDervoort had been disciplined for professional misconduct twice before.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, voluntarily participated in drug and alcohol treatment beyond what was ordered by the criminal court, submitted good character reference letters from five individuals, and did not harm any clients or the public through his misconduct.

On May 13, 2024, VanDervoort filed his resignation with charges pending--acknowledging he is ineligible to practice law or to advertise or hold himself out as entitled to practice law.

--Barbara Kate Repa