People v. Chong

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL O. CHONG, Defendant and Appellant. No. C030332 (Super.Ct.No. 96F07352) California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District (Sacramento) Filed November 15, 1999 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
        APPEAL FROM a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Richard H. Gilmour, Judge. Affirmed.
        John Hardesty, under appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
        Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross and Michael J. Weinberger, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

        A jury convicted defendant Paul O. Chong of crimes relating to his participation in an insurance fraud scheme in which luxury cars were purchased in the United States, shipped to Hong Kong for sale in China, and then reported stolen here to collect insurance proceeds. Defendant was granted probation on the condition, among others, that he serve a period of confinement in the county jail. On appeal, he raises a variety of contentions.
        In the published portion of this opinion, we reject defendant's assertion that the trial court committed prejudicial error by repeatedly admonishing defense counsel, Maureen Kallins, in the presence of the jury. Defendant does not try to justify Kallins's actions which led to the admonitions. Instead, he argues the "trial judge committed misconduct by rendering undiluted accusations and condemnations in the jury's presence" instead of "simply excusing the jury when [the court] felt the necessity of admonishing or citing [Kallins's] conduct . . . ."
        As we shall explain, due to the many instances of unprofessional conduct in which Kallins made disparaging comments to the court, violated court rulings, and repeatedly interrupted the court and witnesses, it was appropriate for the court to immediately admonish Kallins in public rather than continuously disrupt the trial by excusing the jurors and admonishing her outside their presence.
        In the unpublished parts of this opinion, we find no merit in defendant's remaining contentions. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

[This Part Is Not Certified for Publication]
FACTS AND PROCEDURE* The Insurance Fraud Scheme
        In October 1994, Earl Door, an investigator for the Fraud Division of the Department of Insurance, became involved with an insurance fraud investigation after the department received a series of suspicious claims from insurance carriers. In March 1995, Door learned that Von Housen Motors had discovered one of its vehicles had been exported prior to being reported stolen. Further investigation led to the discovery that 120 vehicles had been shipped before being reported stolen, one of which belonged to defendant.
        Door's investigation disclosed a criminal enterprise, the objective of which was to purchase luxury cars in the United States, ship them to Hong Kong for resale in China at a substantially higher price, and then report them stolen here to collect the insurance proceeds. At the center of this scheme were Tsuming Yin and Norman Kwong. Ken Mek was their connection in Hong Kong. They had a middleman recruit someone, a straw buyer, to go to a dealership to buy or lease a car and thereafter obtain insurance. The straw buyer turned the car over to the middleman, who would give it to Yin to deliver the car to be shipped. Yin used Speedy Freight Systems, a customer-broker, to handle the shipping arrangements. Gershom Shing -- an owner of Pacific Transport and Warehouse (PTW), a trans-loading warehouse responsible for loading international containers for shipping companies -- and Maersk, Inc., a worldwide steamship company -- were involved in the export of the vehicles, but apparently were unaware of the insurance fraud scheme. After the car had left the port, the straw buyer reported the car stolen and collected the insurance proceeds. Before it was exported, the vehicle was not reported stolen because information regarding the theft would be recorded with United States Customs.
        The insurance fraud scheme, which lasted from approximately June 1994 to February 1995, ceased when Yin received word that a ship holding containers of illegal vehicles was being returned from Hong Kong to the United States.

Defendant's Participation in the Scheme
        On October 4, 1994, defendant purchased a 1995 BMW, model 530IA, from Stevens Creek BMW in Santa Clara for approximately $48,000. He made a $5,000 down payment on the car, and the remaining balance was paid to Stevens Creek BMW by a financial institution on October 17, 1994.
        On the afternoon of October 7, 1994, Shing received a facsimile notification at PTW from Speedy Freight Systems, indicating it had four vehicles to be shipped to Hong Kong. The facsimile notification provided PTW with authorization to pick up two containers from Maersk, Inc., in anticipation of delivery of the cars, and the facsimile provided the booking number and vessel on which the containers were to be loaded. Shing called Speedy Freight Systems to verify the information in the facsimile and learned that there were only two vehicles to be shipped instead of four.
        Upon receiving the two vehicles from Yin, a BMW and a Honda, PTW issued a dock receipt on October 13, 1994. The dock receipt listed the last six digits of the vehicle identification number (VIN), as well as the model and make of the vehicles. It listed the BMW as a 1995 BMW, model 530IA, with a VIN of E-91082, which matched the car defendant purchased from Stevens Creek BMW.
        Meanwhile, on October 12, 1994, defendant purchased insurance from George Tam, an insurance agent with Farmers Insurance Group, on two vehicles, one of which was a 1995 BMW, model 530IA. Defendant told Tam that the BMW was still at the dealership, which would not release the vehicle without proof of insurance. Tam obtained the VIN off of the sales contract, issued the insurance policy, and asked defendant to produce the BMW at a later date for inspection. Defendant failed to do so.
        On October 17, 1994, Maersk, Inc., placed the container holding defendant's BMW on board one of its ships. That same day, the ship sailed for Hong Kong.
        On November 7, 1994, Officer Tom Cresci responded to a call reporting an automobile stolen from a parking lot across from a casino called Artichoke Joe's in San Bruno. Upon arriving at the parking lot, Officer Cresci met with defendant, who said that the car was a new 1995 BMW valued at $47,000, that it did not have a license plate, and that the registration information was at defendant's residence in Sacramento. Defendant explained that he parked the BMW in the parking lot, removed the keys and locked the door. When he returned later, the BMW no longer was there. Cresci questioned the security officers, who stand at the front of Artichoke Joe's, as well as employees of a nearby 7-11 Store, but no one had noticed anything suspicious in the parking lot.
        On November 8, defendant reported to Farmers Insurance Group that the BMW was stolen. Some time later, Farmers Insurance Group issued four checks to defendant totaling $4,047.90 and issued a check in the amount of $41,278.38 to the financial institution for the balance of the loan.

Defendant's Convictions and Sentence
        A jury convicted defendant of defrauding an insurer (Pen. Code, § 548; count 1 [further section references are to the Penal Code unless specified otherwise]), making a false or fraudulent insurance claim (§ 550, subd. (a)(1); count 2), making a false or fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss for theft of a motor vehicle under a contract of insurance (§ 550, subd. (a)(4); count 3), making a writing in support of a fraudulent claim of loss under a contract of insurance (§ 550, subd. (a)(5); count 4), and grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); count 5).
        The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years formal probation, with various conditions including that he serve 275 days in the county jail.

The Contentions on Appeal
        Defendant challenges the judgment on several grounds, contending the trial court (1) improperly disparaged defense counsel, (2) erroneously failed to question jurors to see if a mistrial was appropriate, (3) impermissibly interfered with defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and (4) wrongly admitted certain evidence. [End of FACTS AND PROCEDURE*]

[End of Part Not Certified for Publication] DISCUSSION I         Citing 10 instances of allegedly "hostile comments" that the trial court made to defense counsel, Maureen Kallins, in the jury's presence, defendant claims the comments constituted judicial misconduct which interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Background
        Our review of the record reveals the 10 incidents involved the court responding to Kallins's disrespectful attitude toward the judge or opposing counsel, her disobeyance of court rulings, her inappropriate comments in front of the jury, and her repeated interruptions of the proceedings.
        The record further shows these incidents were representative of Kallins's unprofessional conduct throughout the course of the trial.
        For example, at one point outside the presence of the jury, Kallins accused the trial judge of being intellectually dishonest. This comment occurred during the following exchange after Kallins interrupted the court's explanation of the factual basis for its ruling permitting a copy of a business record to be introduced in evidence. "THE COURT: -- you're interrupting. Don't do that, please. [¶] MS. KALLINS: You're just making up facts. There was no testimony. [¶] THE COURT: Ms. Kallins, Ms. Kallins, don't interrupt, please. That was the way I recall the testimony. [¶] Is that the way you recall the testimony, Mr. Hengel [the prosecutor]? [¶] [THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes, your Honor. [¶] MS. KALLINS: How convenient. [¶] THE COURT: Ms. Kallins, those types of comments are -- are rude and uncalled for. And I really appreciate it if you would desist. I realize there's no jury here. But that type of -- you must realize that that type of conduct is uncalled for. [¶] MS. KALLINS: And you must realize that intellectual dishonesty is appalling to me. . . . And to hear the Court paraphrasing the testimony in a way that is less than complete, and is a complete aberration of what was testified to. . . . [¶] THE COURT: All right. We're not -- I'm just telling you please try and maintain some modicum of civility here. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Well, I would -- [¶] THE COURT: I would appreciate it."
        Although Kallins responded that she wanted to be civil, she again accused the judge of being dishonest. When Kallins explained why she thought the evidence did not support the judge's factual finding, the following exchange occurred: "THE COURT: All right. I appreciate . . . the fact that you're trying to assist the Court. [¶] I would also . . . appreciate [it] if you would just abide by the rules of decorum, . . . without which [we] just can't function. [¶] The classic example is, as I explained to the jury from the first day . . . is that the job of the court reporter is to try and write down everything that's said. And that's why we're not to interrupt. And you -- yet you continue to do that in front of the jury, which has been very embarrassing to the Court. [¶] I [would] appreciate it if you would desist from that type of conduct in front of the jury. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Are you -- are you done, your Honor, because I want to say something about that [whereupon Kallins complained that the prosecutor had interrupted her questioning of witnesses]." Then, when the court began ruling that a copy of the original document would be admitted into evidence, Kallins again interrupted, leading to the following exchange: "THE COURT: Ms. Kallins, please, I was making a ruling and you interrupted me again. [¶] MS. KALLINS: But you're wrong. . . . [¶] THE COURT: Ms. Kallins, Ms. Kallins, can you please just [abide] by my request -- MS. KALLINS: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. [¶] THE COURT: -- and not interrupt? [¶] MS. KALLINS: Absolutely. I am sorry, your Honor. Excuse me. [¶] THE COURT: Somehow I do not detect that that apology is sincere, Ms. Kallins[,] [b]ased upon the tone of voice which you're using, which is very facetious and demeaning. [¶] MS. KALLINS: And I would -- I would join that."
        Kallins's derogatory comments during trial were directed at the prosecutor and witnesses as well. At one point in front of the jury, Kallins suggested, without basis, that the prosecutor had "tampered" with evidence. On another occasion, Kallins subjected a witness to a difficult and sometimes sarcastic cross-examination. After the witness, a recordskeeper for a shipping company, broke down and cried outside the jury's presence during a recess, Kallins accused the prosecutor of "parad[ing]" the crying witness down the hallway in front of jurors. In Kallins's words: "It was done intentionally, and it was clearly done with the intent to influence the jury that I was the big, bad lawyer who had impeached and made cry the sad, little keeper of the records . . . ."
        Near the end of trial, outside the presence of the jury, the court ultimately cited counsel for contempt for violating court orders not to argue with the court's rulings and not to make "snide remarks and asides . . . that are obviously designed to influence the jury in response to the Court's rulings." The court explained: "I've given you a chance to make any kind of . . . apology. And you not only refuse, you don't think it's necessary. [¶] And you have absolutely no insight into the error of your ways as to what is appropriate conduct and what is inappropriate conduct. You've been boisterous and disrespectful and blatantly rude to the Court throughout this trial. [¶] And the main concern that I have is not my own dignity, so to speak, it's the dignity of the Court which is at stake. [¶] But it's my concern . . . that [at] some point the People are not going to get a fair trial if you keep making these asides . . . . [¶] . . . Forcing the opponent to continuously object to improper questions, it's unfair and unethical."
        In response, Kallins stated, "Your Honor, listen, I'm 50 years old. I don't want to have my behavior decided like I'm an eight year old. [¶] You show respect for me as well." She then accused the court of being a "bald-face li[ar]," whereupon the court again held her in contempt.

The Incidents of Which Defendant Complains
        Having illustrated the general nature of Kallins's attitude during trial, we turn to the 10 incidents of which defendant complains, in the order they occurred during trial.
        1. The first was a rather innocuous exchange near the beginning of trial involving the automobile dealership's documents relating to defendant's purchase of a BMW. Because the original documents were in the possession of the United States District Court as evidence in a federal action against others involved in the insurance fraud scheme, the prosecutor sought to admit copies of the documents. When Kallins objected, the trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence. The court concluded the copies would be admissible if a proper foundation were laid in accordance with Evidence Code section 1550. In the interest of judicial economy, the court allowed the prosecution to mark the documents for identification and to have the dealership's business manager testify that the exhibits were records of defendant's purchase of the BMW. To accommodate Kallins's request to examine the original documents, the prosecutor indicated that he had arranged for the United States Attorney's Office to obtain a federal court order permitting Kallins to see the originals.
        When, on cross-examination of the business manager, Kallins asked what documents had been given to the investigator that "we so far have not been able to see," the court sustained the prosecutor's objection that the question was "irrelevant and misleading" and ordered "the question be stricken." Despite the court's ruling, Kallins again asked the witness about an original document which "so far the jury hasn't been able to see" and noted that, "for whatever reason, that original is a carbon, isn't that right?" When the prosecutor objected, the court admonished Kallins that her statement "the jury has not been able to see [the original document] is gratuitous and irrelevant. And in my opinion, it tends to inject extraneous matters into these proceedings, which we've discussed extensively outside the presence of the jury. And as you know, the Court has been spending some time addressing that very issue. [¶] . . . [I]t will be my decision to make as to whether . . . [the jurors must] see the originals or whether . . . the copies are [admissible] as a legal matter. . . . [¶] So that's the issue that's pending outside their knowledge . . . [¶] . . . [and] why you shouldn't be bringing it up."
        The following colloquy then occurred: "MS. KALLINS: Look, Judge, this witness testified he gave the originals to [the investigator]. [¶] THE COURT: I don't want to argue -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: That's all I'm saying. [¶] THE COURT: -- Ms. Kallins. [¶] MS. KALLINS: I'm not arguing. [¶] THE COURT: Yes, you are. I just sustained the [objection]. [¶] Ask your next question. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Okay. That's fine. That's absolutely fine. That's correct."
        2. When Kallins later disregarded the court's direction to "not argue with the Court in front of the jury" and demanded that the court explain a ruling, the following exchange occurred: "THE COURT: . . . Ms. Kallins, it's not your position to interrogate me in front of the jury. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Well, I don't mean to interrogate you, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: Well, don't do it. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Well -- [¶] THE COURT: Listen to me, I'm making a ruling. You do not argue with the Court in front of the jury. You know that."
        3. Kallins objected to the prosecutor's attempt to use an overhead projector to show to the jury a document which had been marked for identification but not yet received in evidence. Overruling the objection, the court explained that, based upon its earlier discussion with counsel, it was satisfied the document ultimately would be admitted and that, if the court was wrong, Kallins could move for a mistrial. Kallins stated: "So in other words, you can put anything you want on the [overhead projector] and later you ask to admit it, is that the ruling?" The court replied: "Now, Ms. Kallins, you're being factitious [we assume the court meant facetious or the court reporter misreported the comment]."
        4. When the prosecutor objected to the lack of foundation for introduction of a defense exhibit, Kallins stated: "Maybe [the prosecutor] will stipulate that [the exhibit] was sent to me as 122 in discovery . . . and this can be entered into evidence so the jury can take a look at it at this time." The prosecutor again objected, and the following exchange occurred: "THE COURT: Remember, Ms. Kallins, we [had an] agreement before court that we weren't supposed to ask each other about stipulations in front of the jury[.] [¶] Do you remember that? [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor, I remember a lot of what we talked about before the Court, but this was given to me in discovery. I don't see why the jury shouldn't be able to see it -- wait a minute, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: Wait. This is an agreement that you agreed to -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: Right. [¶] THE COURT: -- that neither side would ask for a stipulation in front of the jury. So let's try to abide by the agreement that we've made. [¶] . . . Q (By Ms. Kallins) This is Defense B, without talking about what's on it, because we know it's not in evidence because it seems like my things can't come into evidence. [¶] . . . [¶] THE COURT: Stop for just a second. Ms. Kallins, please do not make gratuitous comments such as you just did -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: I'm not. [¶] THE COURT: -- that some of my things can't come [in]. [¶] MS. KALLINS: None of my things. It's not some, it's none. [¶] THE COURT: Would you please listen to what I'm telling you? [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes. [¶] THE COURT: When the Court admonishes you to do something, it is your job, as an officer of the Court, to follow that admonition. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Okay. Now -- [¶] THE COURT: And not persist in defiance of the Court's ruling. [¶] MS. KALLINS: I am. [¶] THE COURT: So ask the next question. [¶] MS. KALLINS: I am. [¶] THE COURT: Abide by the rulings. When the jury leaves, you can put your objections more particularly on the record -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: Thank you. [¶] THE COURT: -- in as much detail as you [would] like."
        5. Testimony was received from the "export documentation supervisor" for the shipping company which transported defendant's BMW to Hong Kong. She traveled from Southern California to appear as a prosecution witness. Although the witness had a return flight that evening, Kallins asked to continue cross-examination the following morning because she needed time to compare the original documents with the copies she had received from the prosecution. Noting "we were I suppose hoping that this witness could be allowed to go home," the court asked Kallins if it was "feasible" for her to review the documents and then cross-examine the witness before the court recessed for the evening. When Kallins replied, "No. I have to look through the documents. I'm sorry," the court told the witness the District Attorney's Office had a "victim witness unit" that would assist her in making new flight arrangements.
        During cross-examination the following day, Kallins asked the witness whether, if the United States Customs had validated a shipping document, the company was required to keep a copy of the validation. When the witness answered, "Not necessarily, no," Kallins retorted, "So Customs is sort of irrelevant to you?" The court sustained an objection the question was argumentative, but Kallins persisted by asking: "Well, is Customs irrelevant to the process?" Again, the prosecutor objected. As the court began to comment on the objection, Kallins repeatedly interrupted. After asking Kallins to "[p]lease eliminate the asides when the Court makes a ruling," the judge asked Kallins to explain the relevance of the question. The following exchange then occurred. "MS. KALLINS: Well, I'll pass. [¶] THE COURT: I don't appreciate the [facetious] remark on your part. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Well, I didn't appreciate the Court's comments on my questioning."
        6. The agent from whom defendant purchased an insurance policy for the BMW and the company's claims representative who authorized payment after defendant reported the car stolen both acknowledged they had not seen the BMW before payment on the claim was made. During cross-examination of the claims representative, Kallins asked, "under what circumstances [does an insurer pay a claim without having seen the car]?" The prosecutor objected that the question was irrelevant.
        When the court asked Kallins to explain the relevance, the following occurred: "MS. KALLINS: Well, your Honor, this witness is from the insurance company. You're gonna tell me you're going to put my client in prison for insurance fraud, you're not going to have the insurance company explain how they paid a claim on something they never saw? [¶] THE COURT: Ms. Kallins -- Ms. Kallins -- [¶] [THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I have to object. [¶] At this point, there's been no contention that her client is going to prison . . . [¶] or anything of that nature. [¶] THE COURT: Miss Kallins, that is really a -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: Oh, but -- [¶] THE COURT: -- a situation -- will you let me finish, please, of gross misconduct on your part. [¶] MS. KALLINS: But saying that my client's not going to prison is not gross misconduct on [the prosecutor's] part? [¶] THE COURT: Will you quit interrupting, please? [¶] MS. KALLINS: Excuse me. [¶] THE COURT: I am going to cite you for misconduct for that comment. [¶] I explained to the [j]ury when they took their oath not to consider penalty or punishment, each one of them. And you're attempting to interject that and have them violate the very oath that they took. [¶] Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, at this time I do want to admonish you once again that statements of [counsel] are not evidence, and they are not to be considered by you as evidence. [¶] And I again want to remind you of the law, which I've already read to you. The question of penalty or punishment [is] solely for the Court to decide, and [is] not relevant to your areas of inquiry in this matter. . . . [¶] I am going to have that stricken from the record, [Ms. Kallins's] comment about prison and -- as well as [the prosecutor's] comment and reply. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Thank you. [¶] THE COURT: Please stick to the issues, Ms. Kallins. [¶] MS. KALLINS . . . I sincerely think I am sticking to the issues. [¶] THE COURT: Not when you interject that type of gross prejudice into the -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: Well, I think it's very difficult to -- to -- to work in an atmosphere where everything is considered not an issue by the Court. [¶] So I'm -- I'm really trying to stick to the issues, if I could. Only I'm just trying -- having trouble seeing what they are."
        7. Later, during the prosecutor's redirect examination of the claims representative, Kallins interjected a comment suggesting the prosecutor had "tampered with the evidence[.]" The court responded: "Well now, Ms. Kallins, that is [an] absolutely improper comment to make, and I'm going to cite you for misconduct again."
        8. During cross-examination of a participant in the insurance fraud scheme who testified against defendant, Kallins apparently stood close to the witness. The following exchange occurred: "[THE PROSECUTOR]: I request that Counsel distance herself from the witness, please. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Gladly. [¶] THE COURT: . . . Ms. Kallins your comment will be stricken from the record. You're admonished to cease and desist from these aside comments. [¶] Normally speaking, although I haven't been enforcing it, the attorneys ask permission to approach the witness. And with this particular witness, I suggest that's the best way to proceed."
        9. During examination of the Department of Insurance investigator, Kallins persisted in asking irrelevant and argumentative questions to which objections were sustained. After its fifth ruling on the objections, the following exchange occurred: "THE COURT: . . . The objection's sustained to -- the question you asked is irrelevant. Move on. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Oh, okay. All right. I'm moving on. All right. Don't get upset or annoyed. [¶] THE COURT: All right. Miss Kallins -- [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: -- no further asides like that. Don't tell the Court what attitudes to take. You be more concerned about your own behavior in this case. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: Do you understand what I'm saying? [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor. But you seem to be so upset about the ruling. [¶] THE COURT: I'm not upset. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Okay. [¶] THE COURT: I'm just telling you if you persist in this demeanor, I'm going to excuse the jury. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Well -- [¶] THE COURT: So it's up to you. I've tried -- [brief interruption by Kallins] -- to be as patient as I can. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: But you are trying the Court's patience. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: Now, I ask you respectfully to abide by the Court's rulings. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes. [¶] THE COURT: And not argue with me when I make a ruling. [¶] MS. KALLINS: Yes, your Honor."
        10. Near the close of trial, during a discussion concerning whether Kallins was seeking to introduce defense exhibit O into evidence, the following exchange occurred: "MS. KALLINS: . . . I only was offering it if 'N' could come in to show what a real PIERS Report looks like. [¶] Now that the real PIERS Report has been eliminated, the governmen[t] will have to remark [Exhibit O] and offer it themselves. [¶] Does the Court think that that's funny? [¶] THE COURT: Pardon me? [¶] MS. KALLINS: Does the Court think that's funny? I saw you laugh. [¶] THE COURT: Ms. Kallins, once again, pursuant to the previous order, I'm going to admonish you please desist from disrespectful comments to the Court. [¶] MS. KALLINS: I didn't mean disrespect, your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: Yes, you did. [¶] MS. KALLINS: No, that's my analysis. [¶] THE COURT: You've been around long enough to know what's proper [courtroom] behavior and what is improper."

Analysis
        Defendant wisely does not attempt to defend Kallins's actions; in the words of his appellate attorney, defendant "does not excuse his trial counsel's conduct." He also concedes the trial court had a duty to control the proceedings. However, he believes the court committed misconduct by repeatedly admonishing Kallins in the jury's presence. According to defendant, the court could have avoided this problem by simply excusing the jury when it needed to admonish Kallins.
        Kallins never requested that, if the court intended to admonish her, it do so outside the jury's presence. Nor did she ask the court to advise the jurors that the judge's comments to Kallins were not intended to imply any judgment by the court as to the merits of defendant's case.
        Perhaps Kallins did not make such requests because of her misguided trial tactics, which seemed to include alienating the witnesses, the prosecutor and the court, and baiting them to snap at her, thereby apparently attempting to create an impression that "the system" was against the defendant. In any event, because the trial court was not asked to so admonish the jury, defendant's claim of judicial misconduct is waived. (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108; People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 467-468; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 411.)
        Nevertheless, because defendant contends that Kallins's failure to object and seek curative jury admonitions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-689 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694]; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425), we address the merits of his claim of error.
        As we shall explain, in light of the nature and extent of Kallins's insolent and contemptuous conduct, the trial court's admonishments of Kallins in front of the jury were necessary and did not constitute misconduct.
        Our legal system, indeed the social compact of a civilized society, is predicated upon respect for, and adherence to, the rule of law. And "ethical considerations can no more be excluded from the administration of justice, which is the end and purpose of all civil laws, than one can exclude the vital air from his room and live." (John F. Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America, Lecture I (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1894), p. 17.)
        In other words, it is vital to the integrity of our adversary legal process that attorneys strive to maintain the highest standards of ethics, civility, and professionalism in the practice of law. In order to instill public confidence in the legal profession and our judicial system, an attorney must be an example of lawfulness, not lawlessness.
        Accordingly, an attorney, "however zealous in his client's behalf, has, as an officer of the court, a paramount obligation to the due and orderly administration of justice . . . ." (Chula v. Superior Court (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 24, 39.) An attorney must not willfully disobey a court's order and must maintain a respectful attitude toward the court. (Ibid.; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068, 6103.)
        When, during the course of trial, an attorney violates his or her obligations as an officer of the court, the judge may control the proceedings and protect the integrity of the court and the judicial process by reprimanding the attorney. (People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108; DeGeorge v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 305, 312.)
        Because "events happen rapidly during the course of a trial . . . it is not always feasible to excuse the jury in order that counsel may be reprimanded"; and, "when counsel defies the authority of the court in the presence of the jury, it is sometimes necessary to reprimand counsel in the presence of the jury." (People v. Dickenson (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 127, 140.)
        In fact, to allow an attorney to engage in unprofessional conduct before the jury without a prompt and strong response from the court undermines the judicial process. If, without rebuke, an attorney does not show proper respect for the judge and the proceedings, how can a juror be expected to do so? If an attorney is permitted to flout a court's ruling, how can a juror be expected to adhere to the rule of law as instructed by the court?
        By mocking the court's authority, an attorney in effect sends a message to the jurors that they, too, may disregard the court's directives and ignore its authority. This type of attorney misconduct must be dealt with in the jury's presence in order to dispel any misperception regarding the credence that jurors must give the court's instructions. Furthermore, when an attorney engages in repetitious misconduct, it is too disruptive to the proceedings to repeatedly excuse the jury to admonish counsel.
        For these reasons, the court may act swiftly and strongly in the presence of the jury to admonish an attorney if necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. The court commits misconduct only "if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the impression [that the court] is allying itself with the prosecution." (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353; People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1107; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 143-144.)
        Viewed singularly or collectively, the judge's comments in this case did not constitute judicial misconduct because they were appropriate responses to Kallins's inappropriate actions and remarks (compare People v. Fatone (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1170-1181), and because the comments did not discredit the defense theory or create an impression that the court was allying itself with the prosecution. Moreover, the jury was instructed in accordance with CALJIC No. 17.30 that the court had not intended by anything it had said or done to intimate or suggest what the jury should find to be the facts on any questions submitted and, if the court had said or done anything that would seem to so indicate, the jury was instructed to disregard it and form its own opinion. We presume the jury followed these instructions and did not penalize defendant because of the court's response to Kallins's egregious misconduct. (People v. Harbolt (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 140, 158; People v. Dickenson, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at pp. 138-139.)
        Given the numerous occasions in which Kallins challenged the court's authority in the presence of the jury, made disparaging comments toward the court, opposing counsel and a witness, and violated court rulings, it would have been unreasonable for the court to continuously disrupt the trial and excuse the jury in order to admonish Kallins in private.
        In a fit of diatribe after the court held Kallins in contempt outside the presence of the jury and directed her to stop disobeying court orders and acting in a rude and disrespectful manner, Kallins blurted out: "You show respect for me as well. I've shown unbelievable respect for this Court in the fashion of [the] most unfair trial I've ever experienced in 22 years of practicing law. [¶] This place is unbelievable. I've never seen anything like it."
        Kallins is flatly wrong in her assessment of the fairness of the trial. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not commit any prejudicial error in its rulings and that it was remarkably courteous and restrained when dealing with Kallins's gross misconduct, which created what could be described as a "trial from hell."
        Kallins also is flatly wrong in the self-assessment of her conduct. In our collective 97 years in the legal profession, we have seldom seen such unprofessional, offensive and contemptuous conduct by an attorney in a court of law.
        The trial judge acted appropriately and commendably in attempting to restrain an attorney who was out of control.

[This Part Is Not Certified for Publication] II*         Diana Dalton, "export documentation supervisor" for the company that transported defendant's BMW to Hong Kong, testified about the shipment. After having been subjected to a difficult and sometimes sarcastic cross-examination by Kallins, Dalton began crying in the hallway outside the courtroom during the morning recess.
        Kallins moved for a mistrial on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that the prosecution intentionally "paraded" Dalton in front of the jurors in the hallway and that seven jurors had seen her crying.
        The court held a brief hearing. The prosecutor explained that, after he and investigator Earl Door noticed Dalton was upset following the cross-examination, they escorted her to the bathroom "where she could find some solitude," and the prosecutor then returned to the courtroom. Door told the court that, when his assistant went into the bathroom with Dalton in an attempt to "clean her up," Kallins approached Door and "tried to challenge [him] verbally about it." Door refused to speak with Kallins and referred her to the prosecutor. After Dalton regained her composure and emerged from the bathroom, Door walked her to an alcove out of view of defense counsel "and of anybody else." When Dalton had calmed down to the point that she was no longer crying, Door's assistant escorted her out of the area. They had to use the staircase or the elevator, and this apparently required them to walk past some of the jurors.
        Kallins asked the court to voir dire the jurors regarding the matter because, in Kallins's view, "it was done intentionally, and it was clearly done with the intent to influence the jury that I was the big, bad lawyer who had impeached and made cry the sad, little keeper of the records, who purported to be an expert and clearly wasn't an expert . . . ."
        Finding nothing to warrant interviewing the jurors, the court denied the mistrial motion. The court explained: "As a matter of law, it would not be sufficient at any rate to warrant a mistrial if they had seen this witness crying, but it would be sufficient as a matter of law if the prosecution intentionally took her out of the viewing of the jury and brought her back in front of them. [¶] I'll find that didn't happen based upon the representations to the court."
        Defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by failing to question jurors regarding whether they had seen Dalton crying outside the courtroom and, if so, whether they could remain impartial. We disagree.
        Once a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist or that improper or external influences were being brought to bear on a juror, it is the court's duty to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine if the juror should be discharged and whether the impartiality of the other jurors has been affected. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1348; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 694.) "'"The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct--like the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a juror--rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any and all new information obtained about a juror during trial."' [Citation.] A hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proved to be true, would constitute 'good cause' to doubt a juror's ability to perform his or her duties and would justify his or her removal from the case." (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1348.)
        Kallins moved for a mistrial on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, not juror misconduct. The trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry to determine whether the prosecutor had committed any improprieties. Once the court found that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, there was no reason for it to voir dire the jurors as to whether they saw the crying witness.
        In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the fact the jurors briefly may have seen a witness crying did not warrant further inquiry as it did not demonstrate a likelihood of juror bias.

III*         Tsuming Yin was one of the witnesses who testified against defendant. Yin had organized the insurance fraud scheme which led to defendant's prosecution.
        During direct examination, it was established that Yin had been convicted of insurance fraud and was serving a prison term. In return for his cooperation in defendant's prosecution and other criminal cases arising from the insurance fraud scheme, Yin was given an eight-year term and was able to avoid federal prosecution for related insurance fraud crimes.
        During cross-examination, Kallins established that federal prosecution of Yin could have resulted in a 20-year prison term without the opportunity for an early parole. She also elicited evidence that Yin had been involved in carjacking and auto theft prior to 1994. Yin explained that he did not personally steal the cars, but that others did when he told them he needed a car. Kallins asked Yin how much money he made when he "went into the car-jacking business," but the prosecutor objected, contending this assumed facts not in evidence.
        Noting that the carjacking had occurred "long before" the insurance fraud scheme at issue in this trial, the court asked Kallins the relevance of her question. She replied that she was "trying to get [a] little background here on the organization," how Yin's crimes as a carjacker "all [got] started." Kallins explained: "[T]he defense . . . doesn't think that [Yin's criminal] career was so compartmentalized. It wasn't going to college, then going to law school. [¶] I mean, I think that auto theft, car-jacking, and insurance fraud . . . may be in the criminal world, might be merged into one big event."
        The court reiterated that it did not see the relevance of how Yin became a carjacker and how much he profited from carjacking. Accordingly, it sustained the objection.
        Defendant claims this ruling improperly interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. We are unpersuaded.
        "The confrontation clause 'guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 656, fn. 3, emphasis omitted, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19-20].) "'[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'" (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 514-515, fn. 6, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683].)
        Here, the trial court found the evidence to be irrelevant based upon Kallins's explanation of her purpose for seeking to elicit it. Defendant does not demonstrate the court abused its discretion in sustaining the objection on that ground. Rather, he contends he was entitled to inquire regarding Yin's carjacking history in order to impeach Yin's credibility. Defendant argues that the potential for additional criminal charges for carjacking was material to Yin's motive for testifying because it gave him additional incentive to testify falsely for the prosecution even if no express promise of leniency or immunity was made.
        Defendant is correct that promises, expectations or hopes of leniency from the authorities, however unreasonable, may supply a motive to lie, and the accused has a confrontational right to expose such a bias by a witness. (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 193.) However, this theory of impeachment was not apparent from the question that Kallins asked Yin, or from her explanation of the purpose of the inquiry. When the court asked Kallins the relevance of her question, she simply stated she wanted to explore how the whole criminal enterprise started and whether Yin's prior criminal acts and the insurance fraud were "merged into one big event."
        Because Kallins did not advance an impeachment theory in response to the trial court's inquiries about the relevance of her question, the court cannot be faulted for sustaining the prosecutor's objection and did not improperly restrict defendant's right to cross-examination of witnesses testifying against him. (People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1270 & fn. 31; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 50; People v. Coleman (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 722, 729-731.)

IV*         Next, defendant contends the trial court impermissibly interfered with cross-examination of Gershom Shing, owner of the warehouse responsible for loading international containers for shipping companies, regarding Shing's motive to testify falsely against defendant.
        Shing acknowledged that his business records had been seized by the "state insurance agency" and federal agencies. When Kallins asked if Shing was "targeted in an investigation," the prosecutor objected the question was argumentative, vague and speculative. Kallins explained she was attempting to show bias in that Yin and others were arrested and indicted but Shing was not. According to Kallins, this "good treatment by the Government" gave Shing a motive to testify against defendant to avoid prosecution for having shipped hundreds of illegal cars to Hong Kong.
        The prosecutor responded that Shing was never suspected of criminal activity and had not been investigated; his records were seized not because he had done anything wrong, but because the records had evidentiary value in building a case against the criminal participants in the insurance fraud scheme.
        Kallins conceded she had no evidence that Shing had done anything wrong or that the prosecutor had promised him any benefit for his testimony.
        Because there was no evidence that the prosecution had offered Shing any benefit for his testimony, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the question whether Shing was "targeted in an investigation."
        Citing People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924 (Allen), defendant challenges this ruling, asserting an express offer of a benefit was not required. He points out the defense is entitled to elicit evidence that a witness is motivated by an expectation of leniency even if there is no reasonable basis for such motive. (Id., at p. 931.) Thus, defendant argues, it is sufficient if Shing believed he was under suspicion and therefore testified falsely against defendant to curry favor and avoid potential prosecution.
        The appellant in Allen was allowed to impeach a prosecution witness, his accomplice in a robbery, about the disposition of the pending charge against the witness, but was not permitted to cross-examine him regarding two unrelated pending charges. (77 Cal.App.3d at p. 929.) Allen held this was error because the witness may have believed he would receive a more favorable outcome on all of the pending charges, and not just the related robbery charge, if he cooperated. (Id., at pp. 931-932.) It did not matter whether any promises of leniency had been made to the witness; what was relevant was the state of mind of the witness as to an expectation of leniency and thus a motive to fabricate. (Id., at p. 932.)
        Defendant's reliance on Allen is undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26 (Dyer). "[Allen] simply illustrate[s] the well established principle that the defense is entitled to elicit evidence that a witness is motivated by an expectation of leniency or immunity." (Dyer, supra, at p. 49.) However, where there are no related charges pending against a witness, the fact the witness has been charged with the commission of an unrelated offense is irrelevant absent proof of some agreement which might furnish a bias or motive to testify against the defendant. (Id., at p. 50.)
        It logically follows that, absent pending charges against a prosecution witness, the defendant must present proof of an agreement with, or promise by, the prosecution which might furnish a bias or motive for the witness to testify against the defendant. For motive or bias evidence to be meaningful, the witness must have had the expectation or hope of leniency, which can be based either on pending related charges or upon an express promise by the prosecution. (See, e.g., Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 50; Allen, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 930-931.)
        Here, there were no charges, related or otherwise, pending against Shing; and, according to the prosecution's offer of proof, none were brought against Shing because he was not involved in any criminal activity. Defendant wants to speculate, without any basis whatsoever, that Shing actually was a criminal or believed the government thought he was a criminal, and therefore testified falsely against defendant to avoid being prosecuted. In the absence of any evidence tending to show that someone or something reasonably would have led Shing to believe he would be prosecuted and that he might obtain leniency by testifying against defendant, the trial court properly precluded Kallins from engaging in such speculative and misleading cross-examination.

V*         Defendant asserts the trial court erred in ruling that People's Exhibit 2A, the facsimile notification (fax) from Speedy Freight to PTW concerning the need to obtain a container to ship some cars, was admissible under the business records exception to the rule excluding hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1271.) According to defendant, the fax was not made by PTW in the regular course of business, but by Speedy Freight, a business which was shut down after the owner was prosecuted criminally. Thus, defendant argues, the document was not trustworthy. Moreover, he asserts, no evidence was presented about the mode of preparation of the fax.
        It appears the fax was admissible as it was used by PTW in its business to determine how many containers PTW needed to obtain and the vessel upon which those containers were to be loaded. (Exclusive Florists, Inc. v. Kahn (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 711, 715.) In any event, it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result if the fax had been excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Other evidence amply demonstrated that Yin delivered defendant's BMW to PTW and that Maersk, Inc., shipped the car to Hong Kong approximately three weeks before defendant claimed his car was stolen.

VI*         Lastly, defendant contends the cumulative prejudicial effect of the multiple errors alleged by him requires reversal
of the judgment. Because our review discloses no multiple errors, there is no cumulative prejudicial effect. [End of part VI*.]

[End of Part Not Certified for Publication]
DISPOSITION         The judgment is affirmed.


We concur:
        BLEASE , J.
        MORRISON , J.


* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of the FACTS AND PROCEDURE and parts II through VI of the DISCUSSION.