The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act doesn't apply retroactively to actions filed prior to its enactment.
Cite as
1998 DJDAR 12041Published
Apr. 20, 2000Filing Date
Nov. 24, 1998Summary
The U.S.C.A. 9th has determined that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) could not be applied retroactively to an inmate's claims against several corrections officers that had already been filed.
Byron Swan, a California prisoner, sued T. Banks and several other corrections officers alleging civil rights violations. Swan claimed that Banks announced, over a building intercom, that prisoners in section C would not be allowed certain privileges unless the other inmates ". . . did something to inmate Swan. . . ." Banks' first motion to dismiss for failure to allege any harm as a result of the announcement was denied by the trial court. A second motion to dismiss was brought on grounds that Swan's claim was barred by PLRA, section 1997e(e) which states that prisoners may not make a claim for emotional injury absent ". . . a prior showing of physical injury." The motion was granted.
The U.S.C.A. 9th reversed and remanded. In this case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit found that Section 1997(e) does not apply to actions brought prior to the enactment of statute. Although it had not previously ruled on Section 1997e(e), the Ninth Circuit decided that Section 1997e(a), which contained nearly identical language, did not apply retroactively to claims filed prior to its enactment. Similarly, Section 1997e(e) should not bar claims filed prior to passage. The Ninth Circuit intentionally expressed no views as to whether Swan's claims would be barred under Section 1997e(e).
— Brian Cardile
Before: Jerome Farris, Melvin Brunetti, and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam Opinion
COUNSEL Byron J. Swan, Represa, California, pro se for the plaintiffappellant.
David M. Verhey, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for the defendants-appellees.
PER CURIAM: Byron J. Swan, a California State prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his claim against Corrections Officer Banks. His appeal presents an issue of first impression, whether § 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), applies to an action brought before the enactment of the PLRA. We hold that its application is prospective only and reverse and remand.1
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Swan's third amended civil rights complaint, filed in 1994, alleged inter alia that "C/O T. Banks announced over the building intercom that until the inmates in `C' section did something to inmate Swan, `C' section was not going to get the fan or anything else. Several inmates started yelling and cussing and they told me (Swan) that I had better do something or lock it up." The defendants' first motion to dismiss this claim on the ground that Swan had failed to allege any harm from the announcement was denied by the district court. The defendants then filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, arguing that the then recently enacted PLRA barred this claim.2 The district court granted the supplemental motion to dismiss and Swan timely appealed.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo both the dismissal for failure to state a claim, Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc. , 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998), and the district court's construction of a statute. Alexander v. Glickman, 139 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1998).
ANALYSIS 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides:
No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
We have not considered whether this section applies retrospectively, but have held that § 1997e(a), which contains nearly identical language, does not apply to actions filed prior to its enactment.3 Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998). We see no basis on which to distinguish § 1997e(e) and conclude that the plain meaning of the section is that it applies only to actions that were brought after enactment of the PLRA, and not to actions that had already been filed. We express no view on whether § 1997e(e), if applied prospectively to a claim such as Swan's, would bar such a claim.
CONCLUSION We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.
*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.
1 For the reason stated in an unpublished memorandum disposition filed today, we affirm the district court's dismissal of and grant of summary judgment against all of Swan's other claims.
2 The PLRA was enacted on April 26, 1996.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."
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